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Abstract 
 
 
The concept of the musical work has triggered much discussion: it has been defined and 
redefined, and at times attacked and deconstructed, by writers including Wolterstorff, 
Goodman, Levinson, Davies, Nattiez, Goehr, Abbate and Parmer, to name but a few. 
More often than not, it is treated either as an abstract sound-structure or, in contrast, as a 
culturally constructed concept, even a chimera. But what is a musical work to the 
performer, actively engaged in a “relationship” with the work he or she is interpreting? 
This question, not asked often enough in scholarship, can be used to yield fascinating 
insights into the ontological status of the work. My thesis therefore explores the 
relationship between the musical work and the performance, with a specific focus on 
classical pianists of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
 
I make use of two methodological starting-points for considering the nature of the work. 
Firstly, I survey what pianists have said and written in interviews and biographies 
regarding their role as interpreters of works. Secondly, I analyse pianists’ use of tempo 
fluctuation at structurally significant moments in a selection of pieces by Johann 
Sebastian Bach and Frederic Chopin. This analysis is based largely on tempo graphs of 
recordings which I have generated using Sonic Visualiser software.  
 
The key question that runs through the thesis asks how constraint (as imposed by the 
work on the performer) and freedom (for the performer to make artistic decisions) are 
implicated in the performance of a work. I conclude by suggesting a model for the 
work-performance relationship inspired by Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s philosophical 
writing, which reflects the paradoxical nature of the musical work’s “existence”. 
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Part 1: What Was a Musical Work, Again? 
 
 
“What is a musical work?” Countless writers from varying scholarly backgrounds have 
addressed this question, attempting to pin down and define or describe the ontological 
status of the musical work. Their approaches have ranged from the abstract to the more 
down-to-earth, usually falling somewhere between complex and near-incomprehensible 
for those unfamiliar with analytical philosophy. But as illuminating and fascinating as 
each theory may be, the sheer diversity of definitions of the work, often presented as 
mutually exclusive, might suggest that defining it — selecting one or just a few 
essential factors, such as the score, the composer, the performance, or the historical 
circumstances in which a work arose — narrows down its potential meanings or 
associations. A “definition” of the musical work often fails to be sufficiently 
all-embracing to reflect what a work truly can be. 
 
Therefore in this thesis I seek not to define but to shed light onto one of its dimensions. 
The musical work, in both musicological and everyday locutions, has often been 
associated more with the composer than with the performer, despite, firstly, the 
existence of theories according to which works are sound structures, or are types whose 
tokens are performances, and secondly, the recent effort to include the notion of the 
performative in the discourse to a greater extent than hitherto. The process of 
performing is a fascinating one, and a crucial part of the work’s potentially endless 
“life-cycle”. Much can be learnt about the ontological status of the work by thinking 
about what is involved in the act of performance. 
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Accounts of the musical work 
In what ways has the work been described? Lydia Goehr’s book The Imaginary 
Museum of Musical Works (1992) begins with a survey of the ways in which theorists 
had up to then talked about the work.
1
 She identifies four broad categories into which 
the analytic views roughly fall, before spelling out the limits of the analytic approach in 
general and going on to present her own “historical approach”. I will revisit the two 
most disparate of the four main analytic approaches here, in order to bring attention to 
the fact that the work can mean very different things, depending on the angle from 
which it is approached. 
 
The first approach outlined by Goehr is what she calls the Platonist view. According to 
this view, musical works are universals, “constituted by structures of sounds” that “exist 
everlastingly”:  
They exist long before any compositional activity has taken place and long 
after they perhaps have been forgotten. They exist even if no performances or 
score-copies are ever produced. To compose a work is less to create a kind, 
than it is to discover one.
2
 
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s view roughly aligns with this.3 For Wolterstorff, there is a 
difference between works and performances thereof: “[i]n music…one can distinguish 
between some performance of Verklaerte Nacht and the work performed by bringing 
                                                 
1
 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 13. 
2
 Ibid, 14. 
3
 Ibid. 
 3 
 
about that performance — namely, Arnold Schoenberg’s work Verklaerte Nacht.”4 The 
relationship between the work and the performance is like that between natural kinds 
and their examples (“the grizzly” and “the grizzlies in Brookfield Zoo”); Wolterstorff 
proposes that artworks and natural kinds are “ontological allies”.5 
 
As a subtype of the Platonist view, Goehr describes what she calls the modified 
Platonist view, represented by Jerrold Levinson. Here, works still “exist over and above 
their performances and score-copies.”6 However, while according to the strong 
Platonist view works are not “created” but “discovered”, in the modified view they are 
created. For Levinson, musical works are not pure tonal structures, reducible to “a 
complex sequence of notes” that “exists at all times” (that is, even before they are 
“composed”), but are “indicated structures” — “impure, historically conditioned, 
temporally anchored, structures”.7 Works are “the result of the interaction between a 
person and an entirely abstract structure, such as a sequence or series of…notes.”8 
Levinson identifies this interaction as “an act of indicating”: “it is this action that creates 
the link between the abstract structure and the concrete individual human that lies at the 
heart of such an artwork.” One thing that characterises Levinson’s view is this idea that 
works come into being through the relationship between the sound-structure and the 
specific composer who “indicates” it. It is not a simple act of indication, which is a 
mere pointing-to or referring, but what he calls “artistic indication”, in which the 
                                                 
4
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and World of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), in Ruth Katz and 
Carl Dahlhaus, Contemplating Music: Source Readings in the Aesthetics of Music (New York: 
Pendragon Press, 1987), 352-3. 
5
 Ibid, 363. 
6
 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 14. 
7
 Jerrold Levinson, Musical Concerns: Essays in Philosophy of Music (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 45-6. 
8
 Ibid, 46. 
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composer additionally makes the indicated sound-structure (by itself an abstract 
structure that exists at all times) his or her own. Chopin, for instance, “doesn’t in effect 
merely say: ‘here are some sounds’ but rather, ‘here are some sounds, they are now 
specifically mine, I embrace them, and in this exact sequence.’”9 The work’s definition 
involves the composer’s act. The meaning of the work as it is experienced is dependent 
on the “unique identity of the artist who, in the interests of self-expression, combines 
these brute elements — abstract notes…and who then ends up combined with them, so 
to speak, in the resulting work.”10 This, for Levinson, shows that it is the specific 
artistic situation and the act of indication that brings about works of art. It shows the 
difference between pure structures and indicated structures, and that musical works 
belong to the latter category. 
 
A diametrically opposing view — the “nominalist” view — is one that attributes to 
works “no form of abstract existence… only concrete performances and score-copies 
exist.”11 For Nelson Goodman, works are “classes of performances that are perfectly 
compliant with scores.”12 Goodman’s reasoning for the necessity of perfect compliance 
is delightfully amusing for any musician, even though his logic is undeniably correct. If 
we are to preserve a work’s identity, writes Goodman, “[t]he innocent-seeming 
principle that performances differing by just one note are instances of the same work 
risks the consequence…that all performances whatever are of the same work.” Here is 
why: “for by a series of one note errors of omission, addition…we can go all the way 
                                                 
9
 Ibid, 49. 
10
 Ibid, 51. 
11
 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 17. 
12
 Ibid, 18. 
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from Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony to Three Blind Mice.”13 This kind of reasoning is an 
example that powerfully demonstrates the limits of logic when confronted with the 
actualities of everyday practice. Like Achilles who fails to overtake the tortoise in 
Zeno’s paradox14, most performances would fail to qualify as instances of works if 
assessed by Goodman’s logic. The truth is that we do recognise works even in 
performances with wrong notes, sometimes with many wrong notes: it is a question 
more of cognition, which may involve a myriad of musical and non-musical dimensions 
(including the performer or program announcing the piece), rather than a question of 
note-counting. I believe Henri Bergson’s response to the paradox of Achilles and the 
tortoise can be used to illuminate the problem in Goodman’s reasoning: 
It is to this confusion between motion and the space traversed that the 
paradoxes of the Eleatics are due; for the interval which separates two points is 
infinitely divisible, and if motion consisted of parts like those of the interval 
itself, the interval would never be crossed. But the truth is that each of 
Achilles’ steps is a simple indivisible act, and that, after a given number of 
these acts, Achilles will have passed the tortoise.
15
 
Making a few substitutions, parts of this passage become applicable to music: It is to 
this confusion between music and the notes sounded that the paradox of the nominalists 
                                                 
13
 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 186-7, quoted in Goehr, 40. 
14
 Achilles is running to overtake a tortoise. Every time Achilles (who is obviously quicker than any 
tortoise, ancient or modern) reaches the point where the tortoise originally was, the tortoise has 
moved a tiny bit forward. Achilles can thus never overtake his slow but steady rival. 
15
 Henri Bergson, Key Writings, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey, Mélanges translated 
by Melissa McMahon (New York: Continuum, 2002), 65. Bergson himself makes the comparison 
between motion and music in the preceding paragraph: “motion…is a mental synthesis, a psychic 
and therefore unextended process. …we have here to do with a synthesis which is…a unity 
resembling that of a phrase in a melody.” Ibid, 64-5. Roger Scruton has also noted “the experience of 
a musical unity across time” in a melody, which “is itself composed of such unities: phrases and 
motifs…” in his The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 40. 
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are due; …the truth is that each musical idea is a simple indivisible act, and that, after a 
given number of these acts, a musical work will have been performed.
16
 
 
But for Goehr, the greatest problem with all analytic approaches of whatever stripe is 
that they attempt to be universal, when the concept of the work is in fact not universal. 
Despite the weaknesses of these theories, though, they each bring forward a possible 
way of talking about the musical work. We may genuinely laugh at Goodman’s view, 
but the notion of perfect compliance does underwrite the modus operandi of 
international piano competitions and conservatory training, where playing with a high 
level of accuracy is taken for granted (and, according to Goehr, it is an ideal that “has 
characterized classical music practice…for the last 200 years”17). Goodman’s 
explanation is far from functional as a universal theory (which it clearly intends to be), 
but is nevertheless revealing of what the work can mean to some people. 
 
Goehr, however, has a more convincing solution which, unlike any analytic approach, 
succeeds in being all-embracing precisely because it does not seek to be universal. Her 
famous thesis is that the work is best understood in historical terms, and that musicians 
only began talking about musical works in the way that we do, conceptually and with 
implications such as composer immortality or respect for the score, since about 1800. 
Replacing the question that asks “what kind of object a musical work is” with one that 
asks “what kind of concept the work-concept is”, Goehr is able to identify the 
                                                 
16
 To be sure, there is a limit to the analogy between motion in space and motion in music: Scruton 
warns of “the temptation to think of the sound world as organized in the way that space is, and to 
situate tones and melodies in that world as the apes of our activity, moving in ways analogous to the 
way in which we move.” The Aesthetics of Music, 51. 
17
 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 99. 
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work-concept, which involves a “commitment to the Werktreue ideal”, as the factor that 
regulates the ways in which we have been performing and listening to classical music 
through the last two centuries.
18
 This is crucial for understanding her critique of the 
analytic approach. Analytic views make assumptions — they take certain genres and 
works as paradigmatic examples of the musical artwork (“Beethoven is the composer, 
and his Fifth Symphony the work most frequently referred to”), and talk of 
work-identity preservation as a given — without explaining why.19 And why should the 
identity of the work (be it Beethoven’s Fifth or some other work) have to be preserved 
in the way Goodman, for instance, describes? As Peter Kivy has said, authenticity is not 
ipso facto an aesthetic or philosophical justification for performing music in a certain 
manner.
20
  
 
This is where the historical approach is illuminating. Goehr argues that the 
work-concept is one that regulates music-making. This accounts for two things. It 
shows firstly why people (including theorists) see some pieces as paradigmatic or 
assume that the identity of a work must be preserved, and secondly why theorists don’t 
explain these assumptions: they are themselves under the profound influence of the 
work-concept’s regulating force.  
 
Since Goehr’s book, a number of other writers have contributed to the discourse of the 
work-concept. Stephen Davies, for instance, has presented the view that “musical works 
                                                 
18
 Ibid, 90; 285. 
19
 Ibid, 83. 
20
 Peter Kivy, Authenticities: Philosophical Reflections on Musical Performance (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995), 250. Perfect compliance is, of course, merely one way of understanding 
authenticity, but Kivy’s message is definitely applicable to it. 
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are not of a single ontological type.”21 His idea of workhood involves a continuum — 
blurred boundaries and all — ranging from works for live performance to “purely 
electronic ones that are not for performance.”22 It is an entirely different approach from 
the historical one, but it successfully accounts for any kind of precomposed music, as 
well as for improvisation, which is connected to the live-performance end of the 
continuum. Where a work is placed on this continuum is determined by the process 
through which it is made into a sounding piece of music, and thus human action is a 
major component of the work’s ontology. He writes: “[w]orks of art are made by 
people… They are not natural kinds.”23 
 
John Butt’s “What is a ‘Musical Work’? Reflections on the Origins of the ‘Work 
Concept’ in Western Art Music” again offers a historical approach to the work-concept. 
If the assumption that musical works “exist” does not hold across different cultures of 
today, Butt reasons, the same might be said diachronically (across different points in 
history): that we should not assume that “musical works” were thought of in the same 
way in another era, even within western culture. Concurring with Goehr, Butt is 
interested in “whether the interaction between ideas held about music, various social 
practices and the various musical objects or events at hand together generated the notion 
of the musical work.”24  
 
                                                 
21
 Stephen Davies, Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2001), 206. 
22
 Ibid, 7-8. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 John Butt, “What is a ‘Musical Work’? Reflections on the Origins of the ‘Work Concept’ in 
Western Art Music,” in Concepts of Music and Copyright: How Music Perceives itself and How 
Copyright Perceives Music, ed. Andreas Rahmatian (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2015), 1-22; here 4. 
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I am in sympathy with Butt’s view that what might reflect the matter best is a balance 
between the extremes of assigning works everlasting existence (the “Platonist” view) 
and denying them any kind of power (social constructivism).  
Pieces of music — whether remembered, composed in the mind, notated or 
sounded — are obviously human constructions through and through, but they 
also acquire an element of autonomy instantaneously. …If we are somehow 
changed through our encounter with music, something must surely somehow 
be ‘there’ and not merely be constructed by us on the spur of the moment. But 
what the argument for social constructivism does indeed show us is that what is 
‘there’ is not a stable entity that endures regardless of the energy we bring to 
it.
25
 
This view, along with Levinson’s and Davies’ views which put importance on the acts 
of composition and performance in defining the musical work, could lead to a rich area 
of discourse centering around the interaction between human subjectivities — 
composing, performing and listening — and “the music” as it comes into being in real 
time. 
 
The fall of the work-concept 
Alongside renewals of theories about the musical work such as by Levinson and Davies, 
the last two decades have seen attempts to chip away at the work-concept. Different 
writers have contributed to this “deconstruction” of the work (as Dillon Parmer puts it) 
from varying angles. Gary Tomlinson had warned in 1993 that “we might try to see 
more clearly that categories such as ‘work,’ ‘art,’ ‘the aesthetic,’ even ‘music’ itself are 
                                                 
25
 Ibid, 5. 
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not truths given to us…but rather are themselves cultural constructions darkly tinted for 
us with modernist ideology.”26 Tomlinson’s broad postmodern vision, encompassing 
cultures in which such a concept is not valid or non-existent, again leads to the 
conclusion that simply to assume the work-concept’s universality brings with it certain 
dangers — in his eyes, dangers of a moral kind, insofar as it limits or distorts our 
understanding and treatment of cultural others as we “aggressively familiarize 
(colonize, terrorize) them”.27 
 
For some, the “work” all but plays villain. Carolyn Abbate, for instance, placed the 
work on the opposite end of the musical spectrum from performed music, claiming in 
2004 that “[r]etreating to the work displaces that [irreversible, drastic] experience [of 
music], and dissecting the work’s technical features or saying what it represents reflects 
the wish not to be transported by the state that the performance has engendered in us.”28 
Not only is the work a different thing from the sounding music which moves and affects 
the listener, it is, moreover, less important. “Rather than bringing out the souvenirs and 
singing their praises or explaining their meanings one more time, I want to test the 
conviction that what counts is not a work…in the abstract, but a material, present 
event.”29 
 
Two further writers, Dillon Parmer and Kenneth Hamilton — both of whom are 
performers — have criticised the cultural work done by our conceptualisation of the 
                                                 
26
 Gary Tomlinson, “Musical Pasts and Postmodern Musicologies: A Response to Lawrence 
Kramer,” Current Musicology 53 (1993): 18-24; here 23. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Carolyn Abbate, “Music — Drastic or Gnostic?” Critical Inquiry 30 (Spring 2004): 505-536; here 
505-6. 
29
 Ibid, 506. 
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musical work. Hamilton, like Goehr, takes a historical approach in After the Golden 
Age: Romantic Pianism and Modern Performance, although his book is not about 
explaining or defining the concept of the musical work. Rather, his starting point is the 
question that asks why performance practice has moved to such an extent towards 
passivity and sterility “from the much more varied, spontaneous, and improvisatory 
piano culture of the nineteenth century — when, ironically, most of our repertoire was 
actually composed”.30 Focusing on the history of piano performance, he discusses how 
the nineteenth-century aesthetic climate led to the work being thought of as a sacred 
entity, which attitude in turn regulates musical life today. For Hamilton, some of the 
ways in which “masterworks” came to be treated through the past two centuries are 
regrettable absurdities. I believe his view is indeed justifiable; he refers to a recital he 
attended in which the pianist “predictably proceeded to perform with all the spontaneity 
of a tenth take in the recording studio…the supposedly improvisatory ‘Quasi una 
fantasia’ sonatas [by Beethoven]… It was a miserable experience”.31 
 
Parmer’s iconoclastic “Musicology as Epiphenomenon: Derivative Disciplinarity, 
Performing, and the Deconstruction of the Musical Work”, from 2007, is motivated by a 
view not dissimilar to Abbate’s. He defines the work as it is treated in musicology in the 
following terms: “ ‘works’ are de-contextualized mental constructs stripped from the 
specific performance situations that give rise to them”.32 It is thus nothing new today to 
be sceptical of the work-concept. This “weakening of the classical work concept”, as 
                                                 
30
 Kenneth Hamilton, After the Golden Age: Romantic Pianism and Modern Performance (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), viii. 
31
 Ibid, vii. 
32
 Dillon R. Parmer, “Musicology as Epiphenomenon: Derivative Disciplinarity, Performing, and 
the Deconstruction of the Musical Work,” Repercussions 10 (2007): 8-56; here 10. 
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Butt put it, has indeed done positive work: it “has, at the very least, allowed us to 
consider other factors implicit in the music, particularly to do with performance.”33 Our 
knowledge that the work-concept is transient and culturally contingent, as well as of the 
obvious fact that the work is not a material object, can be continually used to check that 
we are keeping music-making fresh and dynamic. Let this knowledge serve as a 
memento mori for musical works. Moving forward, then, we have perhaps come to a 
point where the work-concept has fallen low enough for us to engage with it 
face-to-face.  
 
Both Hamilton and Parmer offer paths in this direction. Parmer follows his critique of 
the work-concept with a reimagining of what a work would be in a more 
performance-based musicology. 
Rather than discard the concept [of the work], my analysis recuperates it: 
instead of serving as a distant object which disengaged listening subjects can 
apprehend in the privacy of their own minds, the musical work becomes the 
performance process through which music enters actuality in specific but 
shifting contexts of actual artistic production. In short, the musical work is the 
work performers undertake to give birth to music in actual practice.
34
 
Parmer’s view of the work-performer relationship emphasises the dependence of the 
work’s identity on the particular performance.35 Especially useful is his description of 
the reciprocal relationship between what he calls the performer’s sound-image and what 
actually comes out as the sounding performance: “each produces the other so that the 
                                                 
33
 Butt, “What is a ‘Musical Work’?”, 20. 
34
 Parmer, “Musicology as Epiphenomenon,” 10-11. 
35
 Ibid, 36. 
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realization of an idea into material form alters or conditions the idea that simultaneously 
gives rise to the realization.”36 There are resonances here with the theoretical views that 
pinpoint the interaction between the human and musical dimensions as a crucial part of 
the work’s existence. 
 
Similarly, Hamilton’s account of nineteenth-century performance history raises an 
interesting point regarding the relationship between performer and musical work. He 
notes the presence of a certain tension in the performer’s relationship with the work — a 
paradox that emerged in the nineteenth century as it became increasingly common and 
expected for pianists to memorise the music they were playing, rather than play from 
the notes or improvise. According to Hamilton, “[a]s the practice of concert 
improvisation slowly declined, so the practice of playing from memory increasingly 
flourished.”37 The development and growth of the custom of memorisation was closely 
connected to the rise of the work-concept. Learning a work from memory came to show 
respect for the composer and the music. “[I]t became a sign of seriousness to have 
memorized the program: it showed due reverence to the masterworks presumably 
contained therein.”38 But at the same time, playing without the notes gave the “illusion 
of improvisation”. It “fostered the impression that interpretation could have the freedom 
and spontaneity of an improvisation, but linked to music of greater complexity and — 
implicitly — quality.”39 While this idea is not further developed in Hamilton’s book, 
we can see that it shows a willingness on the part of performers and audiences to lay 
claim to the positive values of two seemingly opposing phenomena, namely 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, 35. 
37
 Hamilton, After the Golden Age, 80. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid. 
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interpretation of “masterworks” and improvisation. Today, it seems, we are accustomed 
to this contradiction. It is arguably even a tension that we thrive on, for some of the 
most special moments in music-making happen precisely when this illusion of 
improvisation is at work — sometimes, moreover, in pieces that we have already heard 
many times in the past. It also relates to the idea that the performer actually feels greater 
freedom while performing when they have memorised the music, in which case 
intimacy with a precomposed work and spontaneity in performance do not necessarily 
negate each other; on the contrary, the former is considered a prerequisite for the latter. 
The nature of this tension will form an important part of my discussion. 
 
Approaching the work via performance 
From what has been presented so far, it can be seen that the discourse about the concept 
of the musical work has mostly centered around abstract theoretical descriptions or the 
nineteenth-century history of aesthetics, composition and concert life. My work is 
intended to respond to this discourse from the performer’s perspective, by surveying the 
writings and recordings of twentieth- and twenty-first-century classical pianists. While 
my focus on pianists from the age of recordings gives this study a historical and cultural 
specificity and an obvious practical dimension, I aim to utilise piano performance as a 
source of knowledge to illuminate the nature of the relationship between the performer 
and the musical work; thus the conclusions that I draw will take the focus back to a 
more abstract realm. 
 
 15 
 
My thesis is also a response to the repeated calls in recent decades for musicology to 
shift from focusing exclusively on composers and compositions towards putting a 
greater emphasis on performers and performances. Musical works had long been the 
centre of attention in musicological discourse, and the fact that music is actually a 
performed art form and a sonic event often went unacknowledged. This imbalance has 
been and continues to be redressed by an exponential increase in studies that analyse 
recordings. 
 
But according to Dillon Parmer, the imbalance has not in fact thus been remedied, as 
simply analysing recordings does not solve the problem. In a recent polemic piece from 
2014, Parmer writes that “academic discourse carries out an agenda that aggrandizes the 
scholar on the one hand by demeaning musicians on the other”.40 The situation, 
according to this view, has changed little since 1999 when Nicholas Cook complained 
of theorists who “explain music without musicians”, and of “the assumption that theory 
exerts some kind of hegemony over performance”.41 One of the implications here is 
that the constrictive nature of analysis, if used prescriptively, is incompatible with the 
way in which performers interpret music; that analysis, insofar as it strives towards 
objective reasoning, limits the creativity and spontaneity of the performer. This invites a 
number of important questions. Firstly, to what extent is this true? Secondly, can the 
flow of knowledge from theory to performance be turned around? Parmer wrote earlier 
in 2007 that “performing has yet to be given its due as a primary source out of which 
                                                 
40
 Dillon R. Parmer, “Musicology, Performance, Slavery: Intellectual Despotism and the Politics of 
Musical Understanding,” Intersections 34 1/2 (2014): 59-90. 
41
 Nicholas Cook, “Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis,” in Rethinking Music, ed. 
Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 239-61; here 241-2.  
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institutionally legitimate knowledge about music can arise.”42 This belatedness had 
gone hand-in-hand with scholars being “programmed…not only to suppress performing 
(how-to knowledge)…; but also to uphold as superior, as more prestigious, those forms 
of knowledge about music (knowledge about) which can be produced without any 
recourse to actual music making.”43 
 
My aim in this thesis is to turn the flow around — to inform theory through a discussion 
of what happens in a performance. At the same time, I consider the relationship between 
the constrictive and creative elements which coexist in the act of performance: while 
this may be paradoxical in theory, using performance as a source of knowledge can 
show us that within a performance, the two elements (the constrictive and the creative) 
are not contradictory. 
 
Methodology 
To what extent do performers feel an obligation to interpret a work in a particular 
manner, an obligation that transcends performance tradition or style? (Improvisation as 
a practice also follows the norms of a particular culture, but I will argue that performing 
works comes with certain constrictions that transcend these differences between 
performance styles.) On the other hand, if performing works also offers pianists scope 
for spontaneity, creativity and/or individuality, how does it happen? 
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 Ibid, 12. 
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My project is structured in three parts. Firstly, I survey what professional classical 
pianists have written or told interviewers about the nature of performance, and about the 
relationship between the performer and precomposed pieces (Part 2). In the next section 
(Part 3) I use recordings of pianists as another basis from which to approach my 
questions. I use four short excerpts from pieces by Johann Sebastian Bach and Frederic 
Chopin — two by each composer — centered around moments where the main theme 
appears after introductory or non-thematic material. Analytically, these are significant 
points in the structure of each piece. I ask how these moments of appearance are treated 
in performances — specifically, whether they are emphasised, and if so, in what ways. I 
connect these questions with my larger topic concerning the musical work by further 
asking whether there is a sense of necessity for certain interpretative decisions, and 
whether or how the work allows for a performer’s individuality. My analysis focuses 
primarily on tempo fluctuation, and involves measurements using Sonic Visualiser 
software. The final part of my paper (Part 4) is a discussion of the implications of my 
findings from the previous two sections, and aims to add to our understanding of the 
musical work. Here I draw on Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s model of self-consciousness and 
Goehr’s concept of “doubleness” (a mode of thinking which she introduces in The 
Quest for Voice
44
), as analogies to help better understand the elusive and fascinating 
phenomenon of performing works. 
 
Ultimately my stance is that, despite efforts in the discourse to move away from the 
work-concept, acknowledgement and consideration of the notion of the musical work is 
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indispensable if we are to properly understand how performance operates for classical 
pianists. In spite of Abbate’s “conviction that what counts is not a work…in the 
abstract, but a material, present event”, my conviction is that the word “work” can refer 
to a material, present event itself, as Parmer also proposes. From writers who have 
pointed out the cultural contingency of the work-concept, as well as from the historical 
accounts of the concept, we learn to be conscious of the fact that works can only be 
meaningfully talked about in the specific context of western art music of the past two 
centuries. But within that context, the work is powerful. And although classical music’s 
status as high-brow art seems to have placed musical works in an imaginary museum, 
for some musicians, including myself, the excitement of picking new repertoire and 
discovering new pieces is comparable to the excitement of a child in a candy store. The 
delicious sweets can be touched, looked at, talked about, exchanged — but the true 
experience of the sweet only comes at the moment it melts on the tongue. 
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Part 2: Pianists Talk 
 
 
“Interpretation is a synthesis of the world of the composer and the world of the interpreter.”  
Claudio Arrau
1
 
 
“One of the crosses the artist has to bear is that the date of a recording is so rarely indicated on 
the record sleeve… The artist should have the right to identify his work with a certain phase of 
his development. It is only the continuous renewal of his vision…that can keep his 
music-making young.” 
Alfred Brendel
2
 
 
“Theory, it seems, is not committed to understanding performers in the way it is to 
understanding composers.”3 This, written by Nicholas Cook in 1999, still appears to be 
true today, if we consider the way we talk about “intentionality”. We constantly hear 
and speak about the concept of composer-intentionality, whether in the context of 
historically informed performance (HIP) or in “mainstream” music-making. On the 
other hand, the notion of performer-intentionality is not heard of so often. Even if we do 
talk about the performer’s intentions, it is certainly not with the formality involved in 
discussions of composer-intentionality. Perhaps performers are supposed to be 
understood purely through the sounding performance, rather than according to what 
they are aiming to do. Another possible reason for the difference is that performances 
are the end product, not in need of further “interpretation” required for realisation into a 
                                                 
1
 Joseph Horowitz, Conversations with Arrau (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 121. 
2
 Alfred Brendel, On Music (London: Robson Books, 2001), 17. The quote is from a chapter 
originally written in 1966; in a footnote the Brendel of 2001 writes that things are changing. “In 
recent years, serious record companies have provided the date and place of the recording…” This, 
however, does not take away from the meaning of the quote. 
3
 Nicholas Cook, “Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis,” in Rethinking Music, ed. 
Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 239-61; here 241. 
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different medium (unlike the written notes of a score, which do need a performer’s 
interpretation to turn them into sonic events). But this depends on one’s definition of the 
act of musicking; for the listening experience may be translated into verbal description 
of the music or of the emotions or responses triggered by the music, and arguably music 
is not music without a subjectivity responding to it. It may be, then, that it is the 
unscholarly nature of concert-going and music criticism that has allowed 
“performer-intentionality” to escape conceptualisation. It is, in a way, small wonder that 
composers and performers are discriminated from one another, for their jobs are 
different.  
 
But even if we do not have such a well-established concept of performer-intentionality, 
the performer’s “intentions” have been spoken of. To give an example, Hanslick said of 
Clara Schumann that her aim was “to give a clear expression to each work in its 
characteristic musical style”.4 Whether or not he confirmed the truth with Clara is 
irrelevant; the point is that her performances came across that way. Clara’s “intentions” 
have been inferred — interpreted — from the performance by the listener. It will be 
seen that this is analogous to the way in which the composer’s “intentions” are 
generally spoken of by the pianists I examine in the following paragraphs — 
“intentions” as interpreted from the score by the performer. 
 
How do pianists describe their relationship to the score, work and composer? The 
biographies and interviews of twentieth-century classical pianists reveal not only the 
way in which they see (or saw) their role as the interpreter, but also the way in which 
                                                 
4
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the score, the work and the composer relate to one other. Here I explore what pianists 
“intend” their performances to achieve in relation to the musical work: I will discuss the 
performer’s intentions not for the sake of informing audiences (to teach them “how to 
listen to music”) or performers (“how to play music”), but to add to the knowledge of 
what a musical work is, through a perspective not usually utilised. 
 
“Servant of the music” 
In an interview from 1939 with Frente Popular, Claudio Arrau (1903-1991) articulated 
his view of the ideal relationship between performer and composer: “the interpreter has 
the sacred duty to render intact the thinking of the composer whose work he 
interprets.”5 He saw a difference between his own generation and the preceding one, 
where “the interpreters, the performers, had a concept of authorship that made them 
interpret in a way that was arbitrary and many times false,” and “the vanity of the 
performers came to loom larger than the goal of a faithful interpretation”, thus 
pinpointing a generational shift in performers’ values in the first half of the twentieth 
century. This shift, characterised by Joseph Horowitz as a move from “the personal 
aggrandizement of an earlier period” to “modern objectivity”, might be seen as related 
to the emergence of the Neue Sachlichkeit (“new objectivity”) of interwar Germany: “a 
new, cooler aesthetic” which “preferred practicality and self-discipline to passionate 
subjectivity” (Arrau was in Berlin at this time).6 
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In “Artur Schnabel: Servant of the Music”, a tribute written by Arrau in 1952 (the year 
after Schnabel’s death), fidelity to the score is roughly equated with fidelity to the 
music: “Schnabel [1882-1951] was the first to insist on faithful adherence to the written 
page. In this field he was the first celebrated performer to illustrate the concept — 
strangely enough, a new one of its time — of the interpreter as the servant of music 
rather than the exploiter of it.”7 Fidelity here involves a hierarchy: the word “servant” 
presents the performer’s status as being “below” the music. Again, we see the idea that 
score-fidelity was a new value in the early twentieth century, and while Arrau’s use of 
the phrase “strangely enough” reveals his belief in and commitment to this value, its 
newness at that point shows it to have been historically contingent. (It is probably worth 
clarifying that “score-fidelity” is of course a matter of degree, and that the shift noted by 
Arrau was one from less to much greater adherence to the score, rather than a leap from 
total indifference to complete adherence.)  
 
Sviatoslav Richter (1915-1997), too, expressed his belief that the score was the ultimate 
authority: 
I might have had doubts about the extent to which I managed to play what I 
intended, but I was always certain that, for each work, it was this way, and no 
other, that it had to be played. Why? It’s very simple, because I looked closely 
at the score. That’s all that’s required to reflect what it contains.8 
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According to this the score, and nothing else, is required for one to know what the work 
is. Richter raises two further points which concur with Arrau’s statements: that the work 
represents the composer’s intentions, and that the performer — the interpreter — takes 
on a kind of transparency before the work.  
The interpreter is really an executant, carrying out the composer’s intentions to 
the letter. He doesn’t add anything that isn’t already in the work. If he is 
talented, he allows us to glimpse the truth of the work that is in itself a thing of 
genius and that is reflected in him. He shouldn’t dominate the music, but 
should dissolve into it.
9
 
In Arrau’s words, “[a] real interpreter is somebody who is able to transform himself into 
something he is not.”10 Despite changes in performance style and the generational shift 
in attitudes described by Arrau, this ideal of performer-transparency was certainly not a 
complete invention of the twentieth century. Reviewing Charles Hallé performing 
Beethoven on the piano in 1888, George Bernard Shaw had written, “[t]he secret is that 
he [Hallé] gives you as little as possible of Hallé and as much as possible of 
Beethoven.”11 In fact, one could even go back to the 1830s, the days of Liszt’s Parisian 
battles with Thalberg, for an example of the critic praising textual fidelity, and by 
implication, composer-fidelity. Hearing Liszt play Beethoven’s Hammerklavier Sonata, 
Berlioz wrote that the virtuoso had “solved” the mysteries of the piece, which until then 
had been “the Sphinx’ enigma of almost every pianist… Not a note was left out, not one 
                                                 
9
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added (I followed, score in hand), no inflection was effaced, no change of tempo 
permitted…”12 
 
Much more recently, a younger pianist — Maurizio Pollini (born 1942) — backs up 
Arrau and Richter in his definition of the performer’s role, and in his equation of the 
composer’s intention with the music itself. 
I never gave any importance to — in fact, I saw and see very well the limited 
aspect of — a performance devoid of errors. This means absolutely nothing. I 
have struggled all my life for another thing: expressing the character of the 
composer, the character of the music. This has always been a more important 
goal — from then to now this has been a constant: To try to understand and 
convey the composer’s intention.13  
What would Nelson Goodman say? Pollini is talking about preservation of the work’s 
identity through its character, not its notes. It might be added that what is meant here by 
“the composer’s intentions” is different from how the HIP movement, for instance, 
would understand the same phrase, that is, as being in accordance with the performance 
practices of the composer’s period. The two ways of understanding the phrase could 
even be diametrically opposing, since performance practice of the period in which most 
composers of the classical canon lived did not involve the level of textual fidelity 
thought appropriate by pianists such as Arrau and Richter, and indeed most pianists 
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today.
14
 Unlike the concept of the composer’s intentions as theorised by writers such as 
Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies (which is in line with the HIP-mode of thinking), what 
the pianists under discussion mean by “the composer’s intentions” refers to a great 
extent — indeed, at times almost exclusively, as in Richter’s case — to whatever is 
conveyed by the score: “intentions” as inferred from the written text. 
 
This kind of “fidelity” is, as one might suspect, rather complex; it is even connected 
with seemingly contradictory effects. Joseph Horowitz, in his Conversations with 
Arrau, writes that an “aspect of textual fidelity, as you [Arrau] practice it, is that your 
literalism produces readings that are slightly different from those usually heard.”15 In 
this case, literalism ends up going hand-in-hand with individuality.  
 
Moreover, for Arrau, the instructions on the score are not entirely constricting. “Some 
people think if you apply textual fidelity, you have to be dry. There is this ridiculous 
either-or [of choosing between fidelity/passivity/dryness and 
non-fidelity/creativity/interest]. Actually, there isn’t any conflict.”16 Theoretically 
paradoxical, this is a significant insight: the score, while determining many aspects of a 
performance, leaves space for the interpreter’s contribution or involvement. If one were 
to explain this logically, Stephen Davies’ notion of the “underdetermined” nature of 
scores might help: that it is impossible for a composer to convey everything through 
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writing and that the performer must fill in the gaps — whatever is underdetermined.17 
While these “gaps” might, at first glance, be viewed as unavoidable weaknesses or 
limitations of scores, in a different light, they are what fuel individuality of 
performances, because they demand decision-making, and make space for 
interpretation. According to Davies, “[e]ven if all the composer’s determinative 
indications are followed to the letter, many matters…are…left to the performer… It is 
for this reason that performing is creative, even where it aims at instancing a 
composer’s work.”18 But Davies does not make clear what kinds of elements of the 
music are determined in the score and what require filling in — in other words, the 
whereabouts of the boundary between constraint and freedom remains obscure. This is 
where an approach from the performer’s perspective can be illuminating. 
 
Alfred Brendel (born 1931) expands on this view of interpretation as a creative act. 
Writing in 1966, he makes a distinction between “understanding the composer’s 
intentions” — which, according to Brendel, is one of the interpreter’s tasks19 — and 
“sterile ‘fidelity’ ”.20 “What the composer actually meant when he put pen to paper can 
only be unravelled with the help of one’s own engaged emotions, one’s own senses, 
one’s own intellect, one’s own refined ears… To force or to shun the ‘personal 
approach’ is…questionable”.21 This explains interpretation as discovering a hidden 
“intentionality” through the interpreter’s own musical, emotional and intellectual 
engagement with the score. Earlier in the century, Alfred Cortot (1877-1962) put it 
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beautifully: “he [the interpreter] tries to discover the man [the composer] in his work 
and identify the generating motive by visualizing the human moment which preceded 
the artistic creation.”22 
 
“Never play the same twice” 
No less passionately, Vladimir Horowitz (1903-1989) points out the possibility for and 
importance of different interpretations of the same musical work, admittedly without 
exactly explaining the reason. David Dubal writes that Horowitz “had often 
talked…about the art of the interpreter. He said the greater the music, the more ways it 
can be illuminated.”23 Horowitz would find his conception of a piece change after not 
playing it for years: “[r]ecords are terrible things. You change, but they stay the same.” 
“I never, never play the same way twice. NEVER!”  
 
In a 1997 interview with Bruce Duffie, Murray Perahia (born 1947) echoes Horowitz: 
BD [Bruce Duffie]: Do you leave anything for a spark of imagination at the 
performance, or do you play it exactly the same as in the rehearsal? 
MP [Murray Perahia]: I can’t ever play a piece exactly the same, ever. So it’s 
always changing, really.
24
 
In addition to the possibility or even inevitability for spontaneity, the same score might 
be illuminated in different ways through a long-term process. Arrau gives examples of 
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such experiences. “In the last movement of the Schubert C-minor Sonata there are 
passages I used to play in an almost graceful way. Now I feel very strongly that the 
whole movement is very tragic, very close to the idea of death.”25 Or, on revisiting the 
Schubert B-flat Sonata, “[t]he meaning of the last movement, which is so problematic, 
became very clear to me…what I mainly feel now is the ambivalence of the theme…my 
conviction is very, very strong.”26 Wilhelm Backhaus (1884-1969), too: “[e]ach time I 
re-play the Moonlight Sonata, for example, I feel that I am playing a new, unknown 
piece that must be worked out again from the first note to the last.”27 And Perahia: 
BD: When you come back to a piece that you have known for a long time, is it 
like coming back to an old friend, or do you get a clean score and start over? 
MP: Clean score and start over. 
BD: Do you always discover new things? 
MP: Always! And always I wonder how could I have played it like that, or how 
did I not see this. 
BD: I assume it’s not the music that’s changed? [Both laugh] 
MP: Music hasn’t changed, no!28 
The attitude of “clean score and start over” is one in which the performer actively 
searches for new insights into the score. The fact that a performer can see the work in a 
different way after a period of time has an interesting implication. Firstly, it means that 
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the performer could not previously see the work in the later way — there is a kind of 
constraint in the way the work presented itself to the performer at the earlier point in 
time. At any stage, he or she may be experiencing a feeling similar to Richter’s certainty 
that, for a particular work, “it was this way, and no other, that it had to be played”, or 
Arrau’s “very, very strong” conviction regarding the work’s meaning.  
 
While there is a seeming necessity as to how the work should sound, it is, on the other 
hand, not the only way it can sound, for coming back to the work at a different time 
often reveals new ideas, and in fact the performer might actively strive to discover new 
ways of interpreting the score. And these seemingly contradictory thought processes — 
on the one hand being convinced of one particular way, and at the same time accepting 
different interpretations — can take place within one pianist’s mind. 
 
Glenn Gould (1932-1982), for instance, speaks of the days when he “was fighting a 
battle in which I was never going to get a surrender flag from my teacher on the way in 
which Bach should go”, and that the playing of “the Bach ‘specialists,’… — Casals, 
Landowska, and so on”, which involved “enormous amounts of rubato”, “to me, was 
not really Bach.”29 He was convinced, in other words, of how the music should sound. 
But he also admitted that he found himself “more genuinely drawn to the essence of 
Beethoven in Schnabel than I ever have been by anybody [else]”, although Schnabel’s 
manner of playing was different from his own: “I would play with very firm, very tight 
rhythmic features. But Schnabel doesn’t.”30 Thus, there is, in addition to the freedom 
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for a pianist to play a work differently from performance to performance, freedom for 
pianists to play differently from each other — though if, as Perahia says, “[y]ou’re not 
the same person you were a year ago”31, it may not be necessary to treat the two — 
difference in time, and difference in performer — separately. (In fact, Backhaus would 
try to explain this quasi-scientifically: “[w]hen you think that the human organism is 
always renewing itself and that, physiologically speaking, our cells change every seven 
years, it is hardly surprising that one becomes a new man at every fresh approach to a 
masterpiece.”32) 
 
A relationship with the music 
Returning to the extract from Perahia’s interview quoted above, no less telling is the 
conviction that “the music hasn’t changed”: it is taken for granted to the extent that the 
idea of the music changing is absurd. In other words, “the music” remains as it always 
was, but “new things” can be discovered in it depending on the interpreter’s attitude. 
While it may seem obvious that the music — that is, the piece — is not going to grow 
or shrink on its own, it is revealing that “the music” is talked of almost as an entity with 
substance and materiality. We might recall what John Butt wrote: “If we are somehow 
changed through our encounter with music, something must surely somehow be ‘there’ 
and not merely be constructed by us on the spur of the moment.”33 Rather, we are 
changing in the period between encounters with the music, according to Perahia.  
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“The music” sometimes even takes on the composer’s name in the discussions of 
pianists, as can be seen in the Gould quotes from above — “the way in which Bach 
should go”, or “the essence of Beethoven in Schnabel”. Pollini even speaks of “[m]y 
relationship with Chopin”: it “has become…closer and closer to his [Chopin’s] music as 
time passes — I have become more and more enthusiastic. He’s a miracle.”34 That is, 
Chopin’s music is a miracle. And it is striking to what extent the composer (at least the 
name), the score and the music are spoken of almost as a kind of fused entity. The 
three-headed musical dog even seems to have agency, so much so that the pianist can 
have a “relationship” with it. 
 
As we have seen, this “relationship” seems to involve a sense of interpretative necessity 
on the one hand and freedom on the other. Wolfgang Sandner’s liner notes written for 
Keith Jarrett’s recordings of the Well-Tempered Clavier are intriguing and possibly 
illuminating (Jarrett, born 1945, is a jazz pianist and composer). It includes a passage 
that implies a certain relationship between work and performer:  
And Keith Jarrett? To me his interpretations appear unstrained and lively in an 
exemplary way: emphasizing nothing, demanding nothing, concealing nothing 
and withholding nothing. In one word: natural — that is, following the inherent 
laws of the works…35 
This resonates with what he quotes Jarrett himself as having said: “[t]ake…the works of 
J. S. Bach: In most of what I have heard in the interpretation of other pianists, I feel that 
                                                 
34
 Finane, Illuminating the Masters. 
35
 Wolfgang Sandner, liner notes to Keith Jarrett, J. S. Bach: Das Wohltemperierte Klavier Buch I 
(ECM Records 853 246-2, 1988).  
 32 
 
too much is imposed upon the music. The very direction of the lines, the moving of 
notes are inherently expressive.”36 This is the same idea of performer-transparency 
which Shaw, Richter and Pollini had spelled out. According to this, the manner of 
interpretation is, for these performers, not negotiable. Yet, according to Sandner, this 
does not rule out the performer’s agency. “It has something to do with a certain kind of 
freedom: Not being able to do what one wants, but wanting to do what one can.”37 
What this suggests (at least in my interpretation of this enigmatic turn of phrase) is a 
tension between the performer wanting to do something, anything, and the work 
allowing this to happen only at particular moments. 
 
The what and how questions 
Perahia provides a clearer account of a related idea. It is to do with the nature of the 
differences between performances of the same piece: 
I can’t ever play a piece exactly the same [quoted above]… Even though I have 
set ideas, things I want to try to show in the music are not actually on the 
surface of it. I can show it [the idea] with a diminuendo; I can show it with a 
crescendo. It wouldn’t make that much difference. But the point is, let’s say 
I’m showing a dissonant chord resolving in a phrase. I’ll decide at the last 
minute how it’s going to go.38 
On the one hand, what or where he shows — say a particular dissonance — is worked 
out ahead of the performance. On the other hand, how he shows it — say through 
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dynamics — may change from performance to performance. Thus a coexistence of 
deliberation and spontaneity: the former in the “what” and the latter in the “how” of 
“showing” a feature in the score. 
 
Having surveyed the language in which these pianists (and their critics) characterise 
their roles as interpreters, a couple of ideas should be kept in mind during the analysis 
of recordings in the following section. The main point is that on the one hand these 
pianists acknowledge that there are elements determined by the score; on the other there 
is the contribution of the interpreter. This coexistence of constraint and freedom for the 
performer seems to be happening in at least two ways. Firstly, there is a sense of 
necessity or constraint in that the pianist often feels certain as to how aspects of the 
work “should sound”, although at a different time or at the hands of another pianist, the 
work is interpreted differently. Pianists such as Horowitz, Perahia, Brendel and Gould 
all acknowledge this freedom for interpretation. The second way in which constraint 
and freedom coexist involves the idea raised in Perahia’s interview. This runs as 
follows: while the elements of the score that are to be brought out are determined in 
accordance with the work’s structure and decided in advance by the performer, there is 
a greater freedom regarding the manner in which the features are emphasised — this 
might even be decided on the spot during the performance.  
 
From this it can be seen that the determined and underdetermined elements of the work 
(to use Davies’s terms), or the constraint and freedom — which the work respectively 
“imposes on” and “grants” the performer — coexist in the moment of performance, but 
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that their respective boundaries are explicable in terms of the “what” and “how” 
questions. 
 
Is this view of the nature of the relationship between performer and musical work 
identifiable in recordings of actual performances? This is the consideration of the next 
section. My aim is to trace the seemingly contradictory elements coexisting in the act of 
performance, which have been described so poetically by Cortot: 
What a paradoxical and touching ambition, stamped as much with boldness as 
with humility! What burning desire for submission… What a stirring vision, 
inspiring us to see in the movement of a great work of art some echo of our 
own aspirations, and seducing us, at times in such a wonderful way, into the 
belief that the soul of the composer might truly abide in ours.
39
 
                                                 
39
 Gavoty, Great Concert Artists: Alfred Cortot, 27. 
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Part 3: Pianists Play 
 
 
In this section I use recordings of excerpts from a selection of pieces by Johann 
Sebastian Bach and Frederic Chopin to analyse tempo fluctuation at structurally 
significant moments in each piece: where the main theme appears after non-thematic or 
introductory material. My analysis is based on tempo graphs generated through Sonic 
Visualiser software. 
 
I have selected Bach and Chopin for a number of reasons. They are performed often — 
most pianists have played the music of these two composers. This could either suggest 
that there are as many different ways of interpreting their music; or, on the other hand, 
the fact that it is heard so often could result in pianists having difficulty escaping an 
established manner of playing. More importantly, the music of the two composers is 
associated with differing performance styles. In our conceptions of appropriate Chopin 
performance, the idea of rubato is a sine qua non, whereas Bach’s music (especially in 
mainstream performance) is usually associated with greater metrical strictness, or at 
least a different kind of rhythmic flexibility from the sweeping rubato we apply to 
romantic music. Surveying these two composers would offer a wide ambit of 
performance styles. 
 
While my primary focus is on tempo fluctuation, this is, of course, only one of the many 
expressive dimensions involved in piano performance: others include dynamics, timbre, 
pedaling, articulation. These are all utilised by pianists to create certain characters, 
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moods and other expressive qualities. I have chosen duration as it is the most accurately 
measurable dimension and allows comparison between recordings of varying quality. In 
addition, tempo fluctuation arguably plays one of the most significant roles in 
expressive music-making, and the quality and quantity of rubato are often markers that 
define performance styles or schools. Inevitably, the actual effect of each performance 
(which may include, for instance, dramatic effects created by dynamic swells) will not 
be reflected fully in the discussion; it is of course best for the reader to also hear the 
recordings of the performances under discussion.
1
 
 
Numerous studies have analysed pianists’ use of rubato in recordings to uncover 
distinctions between different performance styles. For instance, in a chapter from his 
Beyond the Score: Music as Performance, Nicholas Cook has used recordings of 
Chopin’s Mazurkas to discuss the way in which pianists shape, or do not shape, the 
phrase as a unit through the combination of dynamics and rubato.
2
 Neal Peres Da Costa 
discusses “metrical rubato” — an expressive device involving “the rhythmic alteration 
of melody notes while essentially preserving the metrical regularity of the 
accompaniment” — along with other rhythmic devices (such as dotting and notes 
inégales), as described in documents as well as heard in early recordings.
3
 His 
exploration not only reveals the difference between performance styles then and now 
                                                 
1
 The excerpts are available from this link: 
https://1drv.ms/f/s!AuVuVDZrnl2TgWBISZrrmUOqR4Ji  
2
 Nicholas Cook, “Objective Expression” in Beyond the Score: Music as Performance (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2013). Cook’s larger message is that stylistic practices are culturally 
contingent and rooted in ideologies that are historically constructed; his aim is to destabilise the 
assumption that such ideologies are universal. 
3
 Neal Peres Da Costa, “Metrical Rubato and Other Forms of Rhythmic Alteration” in Off the 
Record: Performing Practices in Romantic Piano Playing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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but simultaneously opens up new (or at least newly rediscovered) expressive 
possibilities for musicians performing today. 
 
My focus is on boundary areas, where there is no break in the flow of notes, and thus 
one moment — one cadence — is both an ending of a passage and a beginning of a 
theme. For Philip Bohlman, boundaries are fascinating areas for philosophical 
exploration. Writing that borders “are among the most ontologically complex spaces, in 
music no less than in life”, Bohlman relates the idea of boundaries to aporia — a logical 
threshold that cannot be crossed or resolved.
4
 He describes 
aporia at borders functioning in three ways, drawing upon Jacques Derrida’s 
writings on aporia and death…: 1) the first function of aporia is that of a line 
that separates, hence must be crossed [in order to reconcile or move between 
the two sides]; 2) aporia can represent a zone of difference, of overlapping, of 
fullness; and 3) aporia can describe an area of impossibility and unknowability, 
of silence and emptiness.
5
 
Aporia, an incompatibility that creates a boundary between two sides, might be applied 
to boundary areas in musical works. In the examples I have chosen, there is a distinction 
between the identities of thematic and non-thematic material, which creates a border at 
the very moment a theme enters after an introductory or connecting passage. 
Analytically, they are distinct sections with distinct functions and are thus 
conceptualised as separate entities, yet in the actuality of a performance, the boundary 
between them is crossed (literally, just as Achilles overtakes the tortoise). In light of 
                                                 
4
 Philip V. Bohlman, “Analysing Aporia,” Twentieth-Century Music 8/2 (2012): 133-151; here 133. 
5
 Ibid, 135-6. 
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this, boundaries in works seem to be significant moments that would potentially 
demand emphasis or expression. 
 
By using such moments as starting points for analysing tempo fluctuation, my aim is to 
explore the connections between the score, the music, and the performance. Points of 
thematic arrival could be treated in more than one way: they can be, for example, 
slowed-down into, or cause the tempo to drop in the aftermath, or do both or neither. 
The key question is one that asks: in what ways are the constrictions of the score and the 
performer’s freedom evident in the performance of a work?  
 
I have selected the following moments of arrival: 
 
Bach: 
Prelude in F minor from the Well-Tempered Clavier Book I, BWV 857, second 
half of bar 16; 
Italian Concerto BWV 971, First movement, bar 163. 
 
Chopin: 
Polonaise in A flat major, Op. 53 “Heroic”, bar 17; 
Waltz in D flat major, Op. 64 No. 1 “Minute”, bar 5.6 
 
All these examples lack specific indications in the score dictating tempo changes (such 
as rit. followed by a tempo). The score of the Polonaise, however, has a crescendo 
                                                 
6
 The score of each excerpt is included in Appendix 1. 
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marked over the two bars immediately before the entry of the theme, a forte on the 
downbeat of the entry, and a short (one-beat) hairpin diminuendo from there. In each 
excerpt, I examine the bars surrounding the appearance of the theme in order to show 
how pianists handle both the lead-up and aftermath of the event. I have intentionally 
included performances from a wide range of decades from the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, as well as (for the Bach examples) harpsichord performances and 
one recording by Keith Jarrett, a musician also active as a jazz pianist and composer.  
 
Using Sonic Visualiser — tapping along with a recording in order to generate tempo 
graphs — has been revealing to a much greater extent than I had expected, particularly 
in the comparison between performances. As I will discuss, it shows a remarkable 
consensus between performers in certain matters, as well as divergence regarding 
others. The graphs show the tempo (in beats per minute) since the previous beat, so that 
if there is a slowing-down or broadening within a beat, the graph will have a downward 
slope to the next beat; a rising slope represents a quickening of tempo within the beat 
(this is also why the values only begin from the second beat of each example — there is 
no “previous beat” for the first one).7 Where there is dislocation between the hands I 
have taken the right-hand note as the beat, since it is the melody to which the ear is 
drawn more strongly (in all these examples the melody is in the right hand). 
 
                                                 
7
 My knowledge for using Sonic Visualiser was learnt from this website: Nicholas Cook and Daniel 
Leech-Wilkinson, A Musicologist’s Guide to Sonic Visualiser, 
http://www.charm.rhul.ac.uk/analysing/p9_1.html (accessed 1 October 2016). 
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Bach, Prelude in F minor, BWV 857 
In this example, the moment of arrival, at the third crotchet beat of bar 16, involves a 
deceptive cadence in f minor over which the opening theme returns (this theme does not 
return at any other point in the Prelude). The graph (Fig. 3.1) shows the tempo for every 
crotchet beat.
8
  
 
 
 
At a glance, the graph shows one point where every single performance slows down: 
namely the lead-up to the arrival at the third crotchet beat of bar 16 and its immediate 
aftermath. The trough at that beat (in all performances) represents a slowing-down up to 
                                                 
8
 Measuring every quaver would show greater fluctuation in some performances: Jarrett, for 
instance, often draws out the first two semiquavers and goes quicker through the second half of the 
crotchet beat. 
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the previous beat, and a regaining of speed from the beat of the arrival, or the beat 
following the arrival, in Jarrett’s case.  
 
Coexistent with this consensus regarding the location for slowing down, though, there is 
greater divergence between performances here than elsewhere on the graph regarding 
the rate and degree of slowing down: in other words, there is a significant variety in the 
shape of the drop among the performances. Tureck’s and Feinberg’s troughs drop 
deepest, whereas Gould’s subtle dip is more like a nuance. (Of course, the combination 
of the tempo drop with other expressive dimensions can result in a different effect from 
what the numbers would suggest on their own — coupled with a sudden change of 
dynamics, colour or articulation, a small ritenuto could make as much of an impression 
as a more exaggerated one with no dynamic change.) Something that is not represented 
in the tempo graph is the fact that Tureck clearly is using inflections in the tempo to 
bring out the difference in the two voices in the right hand (she hesitates before entries 
in the upper voice) from the second half of bar 15 to the first half of bar 16, hence the 
comparatively significant dip in tempo. 
 
In addition to the degree of the tempo drop, there is variety among performances as to 
the span of music involved in the slowing down: where the ritardando or ritenuto starts 
and where the accelerando or in tempo happens. In the performances of Tureck and 
Feinberg, there is a ritardando beginning on the last crotchet beat of bar 15 which 
continues through the first half of bar 16 while Schiff’s begins in bar 16; the 
slowing-down in the performances of Kirkpatrick, Fischer and Richter is even longer, 
whereas Gould, Jarrett and Ashkenazy pull back only during the second crotchet beat of 
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bar 16. By the beginning of the fourth crotchet of bar 16 (i.e. within the third crotchet), 
all performances are back to a faster tempo except Jarrett, who emphasises the arrival 
through pulling back the tempo more in the aftermath than in the lead-up. The meaning, 
or character, of the lead-up and appearance also differs from performance to 
performance. In Richter’s rendition, after a dwindling of speed and volume into mid-bar 
16, the theme begins immediately back in tempo, bringing with it a sense of renewed 
life. Schiff’s entry of the theme, after a hesitation subtler than most other performances, 
suddenly shifts into a softer, more mysterious world. Jarrett revels in the now-ness of 
the returned theme itself, not wanting to let go of the first two semiquavers in the third 
and fourth beats of bar 16 for as long as possible. 
 
There are two performances that dip significantly at another point in addition to the 
cadence into the return of the theme: those of Jarrett and Feinberg, at the first beat of 
bar 15, where they both relax the tempo into the downbeat and then linger on the first 
semiquaver. Recall Wolfgang Sandner’s liner notes, where he described Jarrett’s 
interpretations of Bach as “emphasizing nothing, demanding nothing, concealing 
nothing and withholding nothing. In one word: natural — that is following the inherent 
laws of the works…” (discussed in Part 2).9 Sandner’s comment can only be an 
intuitive and generalising one, since it relates to the entire recordings of the first book of 
The Well-Tempered Clavier by Jarrett, in addition to the obvious fact that there is no 
way to empirically prove such a statement, but it effectively claims that Jarrett’s 
interpretation — where and to what extent he pulls back or pushes forward the beat, in 
                                                 
9
 Wolfgang Sandner, liner notes to Keith Jarrett, J. S. Bach: Das Wohltemperierte Klavier Buch I. 
My emphasis. 
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terms of duration — is justifiable by the events in the score. At this particular downbeat 
(i.e. of bar 15), Jarrett’s performance underlines the somewhat unexpected progression 
from the dominant of F minor to the F chord which has itself turned into the dominant 
seventh of B flat: the A natural in the top line and the E flat in the bass come as a 
surprise. He is, despite what Sandner writes, emphasising it, but that is less the point. 
The point is that his pulling back of tempo is grounded in the harmony; the same can be 
said of Feinberg. It is interesting, though, that neither performer is a modern 
“mainstream” pianist, Feinberg born in the nineteenth century and Jarrett a jazz pianist 
and composer. Fischer (a pianist of the same generation as Feinberg) and Tureck very 
subtly pull back the same moment, as the graph shows. 
 
Of course, to assess the success of interpretative decisions is a subjective process; to be 
able to find a justification in the score does not automatically render such a decision 
aesthetically superior. These nine particular performances of the Prelude, however, 
show a general agreement regarding where to slow down. It is at the point of the 
theme’s return, a moment in the music which is all the more powerful because of the 
unexpected bass note. The question of whether it is powerful because of the notes in the 
score, or because the performances render it powerful through expressive devices 
including a broadening of the tempo, I believe, does have simple answer: that it is both 
the score and the performance. At least in this example, one could decide to focus on 
the moment of thematic return, based on where it is in the score, or start with the 
recordings and find the moment where every performance slows down — either way, 
arriving at the same point in the music. But it is actually possible to begin purely with 
the score? I believe that one would need to have some idea of what the theme sounds 
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like, and be able to distinguish it from the sound of non-thematic material. This has 
implications for what we mean when we talk about a musical work. As Parmer writes, 
no sound, no work: “there can be no statement put forward about a ‘work’ (about its 
form, its style, its score, its meaning, etc.) that does not already implicate the agent 
of…either a real or virtual performer and/or listener who is giving account of an object 
[which] he must regenerate in the present to apprehend it.”10 Thus we are made aware 
of the dependence of the musical meaningfulness of a score on performances, real or 
imaginary. 
 
The difference between the score and its realisation can be reinforced by returning to 
the idea of boundaries, and taking the analogy further to the notion of liminality. While 
the score provides merely a border, a line, dividing the preceding passage and the 
theme, the performances — through slowing down and drawing the listener’s attention 
to that moment — create a temporal space or spaciousness centering around the 
borderline: a space which can become a kind of threshold inside which the listener 
momentarily finds him- or herself. The score contains only the potentiality for 
liminality; it is a performance that can actually realise that moment as a liminal one.
11
 
 
                                                 
10
 Dillon R. Parmer, “Musicology as Epiphenomenon: Derivative Disciplinarity, Performing, and the 
Deconstruction of the Musical Work,” Repercussions 10 (2007): 8-56; here 39. 
11
 The content of this paragraph has resulted from a conversation with Nigel Fabb. My 
understanding of liminality in music owes much to Prof Fabb. 
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Bach, Italian Concerto BWV 971 (First movement) 
 
 
 
Taking a look firstly at the point on the graph where the theme returns — the ritornello 
(bar 163) — there is, as in the Prelude, a unanimous drop in tempo (the graph, Fig. 3.2, 
shows the tempo in crotchets). All performances, to varying degrees, slow down in the 
previous beat; Weissenberg, Rousset and Landowska begin to broaden from the 
beginning of the previous bar. Cummings’s graph dips significantly on the second beat 
after very little preparation, thus differing from the other performances.  
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While Richter, Gould and Brendel maintain the slower tempo in which they have 
arrived, all other performances (except, of course, Cummings) regain a faster speed by 
the second beat. But the general tendency, as the graph shows, is to slightly drop the 
average tempo after one has arrived at the return of the theme. The moment of arrival is 
further emphasised in Tureck’s and Brendel’s performances by rolling the left-hand 
chord on the downbeat of bar 163. The harpsichordists Rousset and Cummings roll the 
chord too, but this is of course a standard expressive technique for their instrument. The 
effect of the rolled chord is therefore more marked on the piano, especially when 
combined with a subito forte on the downbeat as in Tureck’s case. Marking the moment 
can involve other techniques: Brendel and Larrocha crescendo into that downbeat, and 
Richter changes the articulation to a less detached touch for the theme. 
 
There is another point in this graph that dips no less than at the arrival of the ritornello: 
bar 166, where there is a crotchet rest following a cadential  , immediately after which 
the theme is reiterated up a fifth. Because no note is struck on the second beat of bar 
166, where I tapped that (silent) “beat” into the Sonic Visualiser software, and 
consequently what the “tempo” at that point is shown to be in the graph, was dependent 
on the manner in which the first two quavers of that bar were played in the respective 
performances; it was, to an extent, a decision on my part as the listener as to where I felt 
the beat. Rousset and Cummings, for instance, broaden the first quaver (the  ), pulling 
the tempo into the second beat back more than in the other performances; they then 
move into the next bar without much more delay (particularly Rousset). Landowska also 
takes more time on the first quaver than in the crotchet rest. Larrocha does the opposite, 
hanging in the rest for longer than her first cadential  had warranted. The effect, 
6 
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4 
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though, in all cases, is one of emphasis on the imperfect cadence which sets up a sense 
of expectation for the next entry; the answer to the “how” question varies from 
performance to performance. The fact that this point in the music involves, in most 
cases, an even greater drop in tempo than at bar 163 suggests there is a significance to 
the silence: it is as though with the gap in the sound the performer is set more free — 
allowed to be less metronomical — for a moment. Perhaps this is an instance of 
Bohlman’s third type of aporia: “an area of impossibility and unknowability, of silence 
and emptiness” (quoted above). If this is what is felt by performers, it might indeed be 
showing that the performer’s freedom thrives most between the notes.  
 
Chopin, Polonaise in A flat major, Op. 53 
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After the more gentle contours of the two Bach graphs, this Chopin graph (not 
unexpectedly) gives the impression of a jagged mountain range: untamed wilderness 
(Fig. 3.3). There is, nevertheless, a remarkable consensus in the peaks and troughs. The 
area with the least consensus is around bar 14 to bar 17: precisely the lead-up to the 
entry of the theme, at bar 17. Extracting two or three performances at a time shows this 
more clearly. Fig. 3.4 shows the tempi of Argerich, Cziffra and Pollini.  
 
 
 
 
While the lines representing the three performances are relatively close together for 
most of the excerpt, their paths split from around the downbeat of bar 14; Argerich and 
Cziffra come together by bar 16 but there is a distance between them and Pollini’s 
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slower tempo until the second beat of bar 17. Pollini begins to regain a faster tempo 
within the first beat of the theme, whereas Argerich’s greater momentum on the 
approach seems to require further application of the brakes up to the second beat. 
Cziffra’s accelerando, beginning earlier than most other performances, his diminuendo 
into bar 17, and the sense of arrival there at a relaxed and certainly new character, 
marks the moment in a very different way from Argerich’s precipitous tumbling into the 
theme, which resolutely bounces off a drawn-out downbeat. The tension built up 
through Pollini’s lead-up by his resistance to accelerating, on the other hand, has a 
grandeur to it, and the crash with which the theme enters on the downbeat of bar 17 is 
really something. If nodes are points of convergence, the region between bars 14 and 17 
in this graph is exactly the opposite — an antinode.  
 
Likewise, in a comparison of Horowitz and Solomon (Fig. 3.5), their respective 
squiggles are least well aligned from bar 13 to bar 17, both shapes at that point further 
differing from the three performances in the previous graph. Solomon, having wound up 
the speed and tension through bar 15, profoundly broadens bar 16 (particularly the third 
beat), after which the theme enters: immediately down to business in a quick tempo, and 
with an almost nonchalant lightness considering the huge preparation. Horowitz’s bar 
16 has a true sense of expansion, his broadening of tempo coupled with a crescendo into 
the entry of the theme. The right-hand notes pompously arrive later than the bass on the 
downbeat of bar 17, giving (together with the over-dotted rhythms) the character of the 
theme an aristocratic zing. 
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The fact of these “antinodes” is simply intriguing. The shapes of the graphs are 
obviously not decided by anything other than the tempi of the particular performances, 
and the presence of the antinodes only become apparent as such when the graphs of two 
or more performances come together. The antinode can be said to have been caused by 
an event in the work — in this case, the lead-up to the theme. A moment determined by 
the music thus becomes a site for a greater degree of individuality and freedom in tempo 
than elsewhere. It is the same as in the Bach examples: while the notion that there is a 
sense of necessity for the performer to bring out certain structural moments of a piece 
may seem constricting, these performances of the Polonaise suggest the opposite, that 
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the performer’s individuality and (hopefully) spontaneity are unleashed precisely at 
such moments. 
 
Chopin, Waltz in D flat major, Op. 64 No. 1 
 
 
 
Here, the majority of performances make a point of the entrance of the theme at bar 5 
by either slowing down into it or relaxing the immediate aftermath of the entry, though 
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in most cases very subtly (Fig. 3.6). Arrau and Zadora
12
 put the brakes on exclusively 
during bar 4; Luisada, Bolet and Lipatti broaden bars 4 and 5; Magaloff and Hough 
broaden bar 5. Pires and Ashkenazy, on the other hand, play through this moment with 
minimal or no tempo fluctuation. The graph in general shows less consensus than all the 
previous ones. Upon closer scrutiny, though, it becomes evident that there are two more 
points in the excerpt where the performances tend to drop in tempo. This is especially 
clear in the graphs of Luisada, Lipatti and Pires (Fig. 3.7).
13
  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Zadora’s performance alters the introduction: the four-bar right-hand filigree written out by 
Chopin is extended to eight bars, and a long (about eight bars) trill is added before that. (The graph 
therefore shows the tempi for the music that correspond to the bar numbers in the score.) In my 
view, the identity of the Waltz is preserved, contrary to what Goodman would probably say. 
13
 I would like to point out in passing the antinode in Fig. 3.7 between bars 3 and 6. 
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The first of these troughs (bar 10) immediately follows the melodic apex (B flat) 
coinciding with the dominant chord (heard for the first time in the piece) at bar 9 and 
again in bar 11, and the second trough (from around bar 18) is the corresponding point 
in the repeat of the melody, with the high B flats at bars 17 and 19. Returning to Fig. 
3.6, some performances slow down into bars 9 and 17; most linger on the B flats in 
those bars. Ashkenazy plays through the first peak more or less in tempo, and broadens 
into the one at bar 17 (with an elegant diminuendo) but does not particularly linger on 
the B flat. Hough resists the lingering almost altogether: his fluctuations are more or 
less imperceptible when listening. Luisada, in contrast, takes a veritable coffee break at 
each melodic peak, and the relaxing effect is particularly pronounced because of the fast 
speed he takes elsewhere.  
 
In addition to the harmonic and melodic event at that point, there is a marking in the 
score which is potentially significant: a set of hairpins growing into and out of the 
downbeat of bar 10 (a crescendo hairpin over bars 5-8, and two-bar diminuendo 
hairpins in bars 9-10 and 11-12 respectively). While hairpins are usually taught today as 
a direction for an increase or decrease in volume, as David Hyun-Su Kim writes in his 
article “The Brahmsian Hairpin,” they are better understood, at least in 
nineteenth-century practice, as expressive markings which are descriptive rather than 
prescriptive.
14
 According to Kim, “[e]arly recordings by inner members of the Brahms 
(and Schumann) circle indicate that hairpin markings were performed with an array of 
techniques, including dynamics, chord-rolling, hand-displacement, vibrato, portamento, 
                                                 
14
 David Hyun-Su Kim, “The Brahmsian Hairpin,” 19th-Century Music 36/1 (Summer 2012), 
46-57. 
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and especially agogic inflections.”15 He identifies four “major hairpin types”, one of 
which seems to fit the Chopin example like a glove: “lingering (hairpin pairs, especially 
in lyrical passages, calling for lingering at the expressive peak)”.16  
 
It is not possible to assert from my evidence either that the “Brahmsian hairpin” was 
used by Chopin himself in the same way, or that the performances I have selected tend 
to linger at that moment because of the presence of the hairpin (might they have done 
something similar had they played from a score that lacked the hairpin markings?). 
What can be said is that in these recordings the hairpins are effectively treated in a 
manner very similar to the way in which Brahms’s circle seems to have treated them. 
The hairpins mark a moment that is particularly expressive or meaningful. Perhaps this 
melodic apex is, in addition to bar 5, a musical threshold, the space between some kind 
of growth and decay. Many of the performances certainly render this moment in the 
music “a zone of difference, of fullness” — characteristics of Bohlman’s second type of 
aporia. 
 
From what the performances show, the combination of the melodic apex and the change 
to dominant harmony has resulted in performers generally taking greater liberties in 
tempo fluctuation than the commencement proper of the theme at bar 5 (where the 
waltzing left hand enters for the first time). Yet, as in Arrau’s or Zadora’s performances, 
slowing down noticeably into or during bar 5 are possibilities. The variety in 
interpretations of this excerpt relative to the other three examples immediately gives rise 
                                                 
15
 Ibid, 56. 
16
 Ibid. 
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to two conclusions: firstly, that some pieces (such as this Waltz) seem to attract greater 
interpretative individuality than others, and secondly, that being performed very often 
(as this piece is) does not necessarily crystallise the way in which a piece is interpreted. 
At the same time, it can be seen that the Waltz contains certain hotspots around which 
performances tend to slow down, and that these places do correspond with identifiable 
events in the score. 
 
Interpretative windows? 
Lawrence Kramer’s idea of “hermeneutic windows” in music analysis — places in a 
work that is marked by signposts involving “harmonic, rhythmic, linear, and formal 
strategies,” from which “we can…go on to interpret musical meaning” — seems to 
provide an analogy for pianists’ interpretative acts.17 “Interpretation”, Kramer writes 
(still speaking about analysts’ interpretation rather than performers’), “takes flight from 
breaking points…on the one hand, a gap, a lack, a missing connection; on the other, a 
surplus of pattern, an extra repetition, an excessive connection.”18 The actual specifics 
of what constitutes a hermeneutic window in Kramer’s discussion (he lists three types: 
textual inclusions in the music, citational inclusions i.e. intertextuality, and structural 
tropes
19
) is not applicable, but the idea that hermeneutics seeks out identifiable or 
marked events, does. Identifiable features in the score, such as a sudden unexpected 
harmony or the entry of a theme, become not only points of emphasis in a performer’s 
                                                 
17
 Lawrence Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), 9. Here I use “hermeneutic” as referring to interpretation of meaning expressed through 
language (as in Kramer’s musicological sense), and “interpretative” for performers’ acts of realising 
the score as sounding music. 
18
 Ibid, 12. 
19
 Ibid, 9-10. 
 56 
 
interpretation but also sites for individuality and expressiveness. Borrowing Kramer’s 
language, these points in the music might be called interpretative windows. The idea of 
windows call to mind lift-the-flap picture books or advent calendars, where the flap — 
the window that opens up to the hidden or the unknown — is not located randomly or 
arbitrarily. Rather, the hidden world is behind a door, a curtain, inside a treasure chest 
— at a surprising turn of a musical phrase, a sudden modulation, a longed-for cadence. 
And here there is a mutual dependence between performance and score: it is up to the 
former to open a window at a cadence, while it is the latter that provides that cadence. 
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Part 4: The Musical Work as a Process 
 
 
It is December; the twilit streets of München are alive with countless little lights, each 
one of them adding to the festive Weihnachts-vibe like stars or angels singing in a 
joyous chorus. As I stroll past the stately facades of the old buildings, I cannot resist 
turning my head and relaxing my pace at the sight of some of the windows. I am lured 
towards one in particular, a show window, gorgeously dressed up with Christmas 
decorations, and I linger there longer than elsewhere. I am not the only one — the 
window has caught the attention of every passer-by who is not in too much of a hurry to 
notice the building’s existence. Some of them glance at the window and move on 
relatively quickly; others take more time to admire it; one gentleman is so impressed 
that he is unable to tear himself away until he has finished his coffee. I keep strolling, 
and see a quaint little window which I hadn’t noticed last time I walked the same street. 
Not many others take notice of it either; nor does it exert the same power over my pace 
as that handsome show window. 
 
The Bach and Chopin examples discussed in the previous section might be understood 
in light of this metaphor. In all four excerpts, there are spots which, like the show 
window, caused all performances to pay attention by slowing down. The amount and 
pace of slowing down, the manner in which the tempo is regained, and the dynamic and 
timbral changes with which the slowing-down is combined, differ from performance to 
performance.  
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Does this happen because the music “demands it” — because it feels or sounds right? 
(Of course, such an idea takes for granted familiarity with the harmonic and rhythmic 
conventions of western classical music.) If so, the knowledge of where to slow down is 
of a kind that originates in the acts of listening and performing (if not necessarily 
physically at the piano). Unpacking this, we see a self-reflexive, circular situation 
arising: the music — the “sounding thing” — dictates how the newly instantiated 
“sounding thing” is to be shaped in time. 
 
Related to this is the idea that tempo fluctuation at certain moments in certain pieces is 
implied or inscribed — programmed into the notes of the score (with no textual aid such 
as ritenuto). The melodic apex of the theme in the Waltz is coupled with a relatively big 
leap in the left hand, down to the A flat; the majority of performances slow down more 
at this moment than at the entry of the left hand and onset of the 4-bar waltz pattern at 
bar 5. Similarly, the descending arpeggio figuration in the Polonaise leading up to the 
first appearance of the theme requires relatively large stretches of the hand; all 
performances slow down here. But considering the transcendental acrobatics many 
pianists are capable of carrying out when demanded (by a difficult work), it should be 
physically quite possible to play these parts of the Waltz or Polonaise in one consistent 
tempo. Pianists could but they don’t; which seems to suggest, again, that it is how a 
passage “sounds” in our conception of it that dictates how it should materially sound in 
an actual performance. 
 
Another possible explanation for the consensus in locations for tempo fluctuation is that 
there is a tradition or convention of slowing down at certain spots in certain pieces, or 
 59 
 
that there are general rules within the tradition for applying tempo fluctuation. While the 
idea of tempo change being “programmed into the score” implies a necessity as to 
where the changes happen in pieces, the idea that decisions are made according to a 
tradition implies a higher degree of arbitrariness. But it is not so easy to draw a clear 
line between the two ideas. The difficulty is that when we are part of a tradition, its 
conventions present themselves as necessity within that tradition.  
 
Tradition: necessarily arbitrary 
Countless studies have shown that performance styles have differed over the years and 
across the (classical-music-playing) globe. Robert Philip’s study of early recordings was 
one of the first to explore changes in performance style through the twentieth century. 
After discussing the written documentation of the teachings and opinions of musicians 
and analysing their recordings, Philip is able to “easily” summarise rhythmic features of 
early performances (along with the use of vibrato and portamento for voice and 
instruments other than piano): 
Broadly speaking, early twentieth-century playing was characterised by…the 
use of substantial tempo changes to signal changes of mood or tension, and the 
adoption of fast maximum tempos; …detailed flexibility of tempo, 
…accentuation by lengthening and shortening individual notes, and the 
dislocation of melody and accompaniment; and a tendency, in patterns of long 
and short notes, to shorten the short notes, and to overdot dotted rhythms. 
By the 1930s, such features were no longer prevalent, replaced by “a trend towards 
stricter control of tempo…, more literal interpretation of note values, and the avoidance 
of rhythmic irregularity and dislocation” among other tendencies; Philip describes this 
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as a move “towards greater power, firmness, clarity, control, literalness, and evenness of 
expression, and away from informality, looseness, and unpredictability.”1 The 
concluding sentence of his book reminds us of the historical contingency of 
performance style: “if early recordings teach us anything, it is that no musicians can 
ever escape the taste and judgement of their own time.”2  
 
Nicholas Cook has put forward the theory that “phrase arching” (speeding up and 
getting louder at the beginning of a phrase, and slowing down and getting softer at the 
end of it) as an expressive device is a post-World-War-II (“modern”) phenomenon. He 
suggests a link between the “streamlined” sound of modern performances (in 
comparison with earlier, more whimsical performances, devoid of the large-scale 
organising principle of phrase arching) and contemporaneous trends for streamlining 
and simplicity in design and architecture, including Chanel’s “little black dress”.3 
 
Such research either directly or indirectly points to a kind of arbitrariness of the manner 
of interpretation in any performance tradition. Yet looking at more large-scale 
tendencies of tempo fluctuation in my project has revealed certain trends that transcend 
historical and national traditions, namely that there is an overwhelming consensus 
regarding the “what” question — what feature to mark as special or important. This 
does not contradict the truth of stylistic difference: the latter accounts for the “how” 
question — how much or how suddenly to slow down, whether to couple tempo 
                                                 
1
 Robert Philip, Early Recordings and Musical Style: Changing Tastes in instrumental 
Performance, 1900-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 229. 
2
 Ibid, 240. 
3
 Nicholas Cook, Beyond the Score: Music as Performance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2013), 211-7. 
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fluctuations with dynamic shadings, and other such concerns that give a particular 
performance its unique flavour. 
 
Drawn to musical windows 
Three main types of event in scores seemed to attract tempo fluctuation in my analysis 
from Part 3. Firstly, the bars leading up to and immediately following the arrival of a 
theme. Secondly, in the Waltz, where the dominant chord sounds for the first time and 
coincides with the melodic apex. Thirdly, and not least, silences in the Polonaise and the 
Italian Concerto. The first type was my starting point; I had selected these excerpts 
because they were boundary areas that led from non-thematic into thematic material and 
I had expected that most performances would fluctuate in tempo at these points. Yet that 
expectation was not exclusively rooted in the score, for I had of course heard these 
pieces many times in the past. The other two types of event (apex moment and silences), 
in contrast, became apparent to me exclusively through listening to the recordings.  
 
Although I thus did not set out to consider or to find out about rests, the excerpts that I 
analysed do seem to reveal something about silent moments in the music: in fact, the 
excerpts show that they are important moments in terms of the push-and-pull between 
the music and the performance, at least in these pieces. The opening of the Polonaise, a 
passage full of rests separating chords and ascending figures, and the crotchet rest in the 
Italian Concerto at the end of the fourth bar of the ritornello theme (just after the 
cadential  ) are examples that show how performances fluctuate in tempo at moments 
of silence, often stretching the time and returning to the “sounding” notes later than the 
4 
   
6 
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metronomically marked position would have it. The magnitude of the ups and downs in 
the graphs of both these examples show the rests to be no less significant than the 
moments of thematic appearance themselves in being sites firstly for tempo fluctuation 
and secondly for difference between performances (this latter point applies particularly 
to the Italian Concerto). From the graphs, the points of silence seem to be moments 
where the music loosens its grip on the performance, and there is as much temporal 
freedom as at any points of structural significance in the score. 
 
As I have already noted, this does not contradict the fact that there are important, if 
often subtler and smaller-scale, differences between performance styles. The moments 
that I have identified are the very places where performances tend to differ from each 
other most. Thus, while these moments are on the one hand seemingly binding at a level 
above generational and national difference, and in a way constrict the performer’s 
decisions, at the same time they become sites both for deviation from a steady or 
average tempo and of divergence between performances. In other words, the moments 
for greatest freedom, arbitrariness and creativity are found in spots seemingly 
“determined” by the score.  
 
As stated in the first part of this paper, the aim of my project was not to call on theory to 
inform piano performance practice, but for performances — the reality of piano playing 
— to inform theory. My intention was to take the performances as the irreversible 
reality, the deeds done, by using recordings as the data from which I would consider the 
nature of the relationship between work and performance. I am proposing that the 
tendency for performances of pianists from a variety of generations and nationalities to 
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slow down at the same moments show there is something, which we call “the music” or 
“the work”, that dictates certain interpretative decisions. Fashion or tradition are not the 
only factors that shape performances. It is worth mentioning that the degree of freedom 
available differs greatly between a pianist (or indeed any musician) performing a solo 
piece and say a string player in a symphony orchestra; chamber music, which is 
somewhere in between, allows for a mixture of constraint and freedom that is different 
again. But these differences are all, in a way, dictated by the particular work — by its 
specification of factors such as instrumentation, interaction between musicians in 
imitative textures, or moments such as solos or cadenzas that allow for greater 
individual decision-making. More importantly, the potency of the work as music (for 
instance its harmonic meaningfulness, which might create a crucial moment in the 
structure) would apply beyond piano playing to pieces written for other instruments. 
Thus if we are to properly understand how performances operate, it would be 
counterproductive to avoid talking about the “abstract things called works”, for they are 
there when we perform. 
 
Or rather, they are only there when we perform them.  
 
So are the “moments” I have been looking at. A performance emphasises — through the 
use of expressive techniques including tempo fluctuation — the lead-up to and 
appearance of a theme. The importance of that moment thus arises from the emphasis in 
the performance. At the same time, it clearly is the work that tells the performer that the 
theme appears at that particular point, and becomes the basis for the emphasis. 
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Then, which comes first — the work or the performance? 
 
Performance: poietic and esthesic 
According to Cook, “the traditional approach to performance” is based on the idea that 
“the already existing work is to be accurately transmitted through performance to the 
listener”; Cook is of course challenging this assumption.4 This “traditional approach” 
would concur with Platonist views of the work, which assign the work everlasting 
existence. It also seems to work well with Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s model of the “total 
musical fact”. His theory of musical semiology involves three “semiological levels”: the 
poietic (involving creation), the neutral (relating to the created product), and the esthesic 
(interpretative) levels.
5
 The work, arising in the poietic phase, is transmitted intact as a 
sounding structure (the neutral level) to the listener, waiting on the esthesic end. It goes 
without saying that such an account would be a gross reduction of the complex interplay 
of processes involved in the total fact, and Nattiez is of course aware of this. “[S]ince 
music is an art of ‘interpretation,’ ” he writes, “where does the poietic process end and 
the esthesic process begin?”6 (For Nattiez, the meaning of the term “interpretation” 
includes both performing works and interpreting critically or verbally.)  
If we conceive of the work as an entity comprised of relations that are fixed by 
the score, …the esthesic process begins at the instant the performer interprets 
the work, in both senses of the word…  
                                                 
4
 Cook, Beyond the Score, 98. Emphasis mine. 
5
 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music, trans. Carolyn Abbate 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), x-xi. 
6
 Ibid, 72. 
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If on the other hand we believe that the work is not wholly “produced” unless it 
has been played, the poietic process extends until the performance is complete. 
Performance shows itself in this case to be the last stage of the poietic, as well 
as the first stage of the esthesic.
7
 
Nattiez’s view tends towards the former, because of the presence of the neutral level — 
the score — between composition and performance. Still, the chaotic coexistence and 
criss-crossing of the three levels seems to be part and parcel with Nattiez’s idea of the 
total musical fact. His illustration of the processes involved in a performance of 
Wagner’s Ring shows that the acts of the composer, the conductor and director, and the 
spectators and critics, each involve all three levels, beginning with Wagner’s 
interpretation of Schopenhauer, his creation of the work, the score produced by him, the 
interpretation of this score by the performers, their realisation of the work, the 
phenomenon of this performance, interpreted in turn by the audience, and so on.
8
  
 
But this, it seems, is more a conglomerate of a multitude of musical processes, rather 
than an integrated picture of a “total fact”. Given the number of subjectivities involved, 
it may be inevitable that the “fact” is not a single, unified phenomenon. But I do not 
think that the act of physically performing a work is felt by the performer as merely the 
sum of three heterogeneous processes. Likewise, a listener hears the music and reacts to 
it in a single act, and the criticism they produce is simply a verbalisation of this same 
act.  
 
                                                 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid, 74-7. 
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The three levels could be better described as being in an interdependent relationship 
with each other. Henrik Frisk has pointed out that both the acts of performance and of 
composition involve a mixture of poietic and esthesic processes.
9
 The artist alternates 
between creating and listening; hence the music, too, alternates between being created 
and being listened to. The situation that arises is very close, if not identical, to Dillon 
Parmer’s description of the reciprocal relationship between the artist’s “sound-image” 
and his or her realisation thereof (either in the form of a score or a sounding 
performance). In both models, the musical work arises as a product of the creative and 
interpretative processes. 
 
Another commonality between the performative and compositional processes can be 
found in the concept of artist-transparency — in the fact that some composers, like 
performers such as Richter and Arrau, have seen themselves as “vessels” through which 
the music passes into the world. The Prelude to Das Rheingold was “revealed” to the 
somnolent Wagner. Stravinsky was conscious of being the “vessel” through which Le 
Sacre passed.
10
 (The fact that these assertions cannot be verified is beside the point; 
what is interesting is that this is how these composers describe their own roles, and 
moreover that composer-transparency is seen as a source of pride — it indicates genius, 
not plagiarism.) To paraphrase Cook, the already-existing work is accurately transmitted 
                                                 
9
 Henrik Frisk and Stefan Östersjö, Negotiating the Musical Work: An Empirical Study on the 
Inter-relation between Composition, Interpretation and Performance (2006), 
http://www.henrikfrisk.com/documents/articles/NegotiateEMS/html/NegotiateEMS.html (accessed 
28 September 2016). 
10
 There are comparable examples outside music, such as the case of the genius mathematician 
Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887-1920), who “used to claim that his ideas were given to him in his 
dreams by the goddess Namagiri, the Ramanujans’ family goddess and consort of Lord Narasimha, 
the lion-faced, fourth incantation of Vishnu.” Marcus du Sautoy, The Music of the Primes: Why an 
Unsolved Problem in Mathematics Matters (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), 133.  
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through composition to the listener. But this completely upsets the poietic-esthesic 
model, for if not even the composer is “creating”, we are left with something like an 
esthesic-esthesic model. To say it in a less frivolous manner, what Wagner’s and 
Stravinsky’s claims indicate is a strange coexistence of poietic and esthesic processes 
involved in the act of composition itself: there is a sense in which the composer is 
finding or discovering the music from within himself or herself. 
 
The model in which the artist alternates between the creative and receptive sides, 
however, leaves a couple of questions unanswered: namely, where is the “agency” of 
the music, and where is the predeterminedness of the musical work? These questions 
seem pressing, because my survey of pianists’ writings and their performances shows 
that the music has a potency that makes pianists talk about the work as though it is an 
entity with agency, and make certain interpretative decisions in performances according 
to the structure of the work. As Levinson and Butt have written, the “relationship” or 
“interaction” between people and the music is a crucial element when discussing the 
work-concept. It seems, therefore, that there should be an account that acknowledges 
the interaction between people’s musical acts and the music performed. 
 
The performance-work model 
I would like to suggest a model for the performance-work relationship that is analogous 
to the idealist philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s model of self-consciousness. Fichte 
distinguishes two types of objects of consciousness, or “representations” (things about 
which we think or are conscious). One of these types “[appears] to us to depend entirely 
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upon our own freedom, and it is impossible for us to believe that anything outside of 
us…corresponds to representations of this sort. Our imagination and our will appear to 
us to be free.”11 The second type involves “a truth that is supposed to be firmly 
established independently of us… When a representation of ours is supposed to 
correspond to this truth, we discover that we are constrained in determining this 
representation… In short,” he concludes, “we could say that some of our representations 
are accompanied by a feeling of freedom and others are accompanied by a feeling of 
necessity.”12 The former type “gives us a purely ‘made up’ or invented object” while 
the latter “furnishes us with an object of experience.”13 But there is a third type of 
representation, according to Fichte — the most interesting one, in a way. This involves 
“the I”: the phenomenon of self-consciousness.  
 
Fichte describes self-consciousness as the circular relationship between the “I” as 
subject and the “I” as object, in which I (subject) see or think about myself (object). 
Here, freedom (of thinking about myself) is coexistent with a sense of 
predeterminedness and necessity (in which I appear to myself). There is an inherent 
tension: in observing myself I am actively creating myself as an object of 
consciousness, thus it would seem as though the observing “I” ontologically precedes 
the “I” as object; yet I cannot see myself unless the object exists in the first place (Fig. 
4.1). “I am…an object for myself, an object whose properties, under certain conditions, 
                                                 
11
 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings (1797-1800), 
ed. and trans. with an introduction and notes by Daniel Breazeale (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1994), 7. 
12
 Ibid, 7-8. 
13
 Ibid, 12. 
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depend upon the intellect alone, but whose existence must always be presupposed.”14 
Fichte points out that there is an “immediate unity of being and seeing.”15 “[I]f I may 
speak figuratively, there is a double series within the intellect: a series of being and a 
series of observing, a series of what is real and a series of what is ideal. The essence of 
the intellect consists precisely in the indivisibility of this double series.”16 One side 
cannot exist without the other in this two-fold model of self-consciousness.  
 
 
 
By analogy, the performance actively instantiates, realises, brings into being, and in that 
sense creates, the work. The performer, a human subjectivity, mixes into the sound of 
the work their own particular style, emotions, experiences, understanding. Yet there 
cannot be such a performance unless a potentiality for the work exists in the first place. 
The respective existences of the performance and the work are thus mutually dependent. 
It is not merely a reciprocal relationship in which the two affect or are advantageous for 
each other, but there is (to use Fichte’s expression) a fundamental indivisibility to this 
                                                 
14
 Ibid, 13. 
15
 Ibid, 21. 
16
 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 
Fig. 4.1 Fichte’s model of self-consciousness 
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double series. As the recordings show, the performance makes the work into a sounding 
event, and in doing so determines how the work sounds, but at the same time the 
interpretative decisions made by the performer are determined by how the work could 
or should sound. While there is a freedom and (by definition) an activeness in the act of 
performing the work, the work is fixed in certain important aspects, and thus places a 
constraint on the way in which it can be performed. 
 
There is, in addition, an uncanny resemblance between the composer’s act of 
“discovering” the work and Fichte’s characterisation of self-consciousness. The work 
only comes into existence because the composer actively writes it, but the work may 
seem like a predetermined entity discovered by the composer within themselves. Of 
course, this description of the compositional process may well fail to apply to every 
composer’s experience. But for me, the crucial difference between the composer-work 
cycle (which results in the score) and the performance-work cycle is that while the 
former happens just once, the latter can happen any number of times. 
 
Where do the composer’s and listener’s acts fit into the model of the performance-work 
cycle? They rather fit around it: the composer’s material product — the score — is what 
is needed in the first place for the performer to be able to kick off the cycle. The listener 
witnesses this cycling (Fig. 4.2). Thus the distinctness of making music from listening, 
or witnessing the making — as stressed by writers such as Parmer and Abbate — is 
acknowledged. 
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Moreover, the performer’s awareness of the listener’s presence also helps fuel the cycle, 
in such cases as described by Perahia: 
BD [Bruce Duffie]: Do you play differently for the microphone than you do for 
a live audience? 
MP [Murray Perahia]: I think yes. There’s an excitement that goes into a live 
concert that’s very hard to capture in a recording. Sometimes it works; 
sometimes it goes. It’s not to say that it’s impossible, but I do find that it’s 
different to play for an audience. 
BD: Are you aware of them sitting on your right? 
MP: Yes, you are. You’re aware of singing the song to somebody, and that 
makes a different experience than just playing it in a room for the 
microphone.
17
 
If the performance-work cycle is flanked on either side by the poietic and esthesic 
processes, we could say that the cycle corresponds (in terms of its positioning) to 
                                                 
17
 Bruce Duffie, Pianist Murray Perahia: A Conversation with Bruce Duffie, 
http://www.bruceduffie.com/perahia.html (accessed 12 September 2016). 
Fig. 4.2  A model for the performance-work relationship, flanked 
on either side by the poietic and esthesic 
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Nattiez’s “neutral” level — which itself involves both poietic and esthesic processes, 
and in fact turns out to be a dynamic process dependent on the performer’s artistic 
commitment to the work. The reciprocal dependence evident in the cyclic model 
suggests that rather than asking which (the work or the performance) has ontological 
precedence, an acknowledgement that one side cannot exist without the other would 
reflect the nature of performance more accurately. This leads to a few further 
conclusions.  
 
First, it leads us to acknowledge that we cannot ignore the idea of the musical work if 
we are to properly understand the nature of classical piano performance, and the status 
of the performer. The classical pianist, performing a work, at least during the act of that 
particular performance is committed to a “relationship” with the work, in order to 
unleash its musical potential. Second, it reminds us that we cannot assume that when we 
talk about works we are not talking about specific performances. We are talking about 
specific performers, instruments, venues, dates, even our own moods, reactions, 
emotions — real-life events. 
 
Third, perhaps the resulting tension, the unknowability of ontological precedence (the 
chicken-and-egg situation) is not unwelcome at all: it may well be what sustains the 
world of classical piano performance. Lydia Goehr’s concept of “doubleness” is useful 
here. In The Quest for Voice, Goehr introduces this concept to understand “necessary 
but irreconcilable opposition[s]” (such as the opposition inherent in music’s claim to 
being both absolute and expressive of the extramusical world). This approach allows us 
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to look the paradox in the face, and acknowledge that it is only a contradiction in terms 
of logic: it is a reality in practice. The argument that underlies Goehr’s book 
claims the advantages of using a metaphorical concept of the musical as an 
anti-systematic restraint on systematic philosophical theory. …“doubleness”, 
as I call it, serves as a successful technique by which to produce a 
philosophical theory that respects its own systematic limits… Doubleness 
supports a theory of open and critical practice. It closely recalls traditional 
dialectics, yet it does not depend upon establishing too strong a teleological 
development in which oppositions are brought to their (pre)determined 
synthesis. Instead, it serves more moderately to preserve both in theory and in 
practice the two or more sides of conflicts, sides that often serve one another 
by being at hand to be denied.
18
 
Doubleness can be usefully applied to another seeming contradiction that has been a 
central theme throughout my thesis: the tension between fidelity to the work (constraint) 
and creativity of the performer (freedom). It is not a matter of which is more important, 
for the accounts of the pianists surveyed in Part 2 show that both the constraints placed 
by the work on the performer and the active creativity involved in interpreting the work 
are integral to the act of performing works. And not only this: it is also clear from the 
recordings that certain special moments determined by the score provide specific sites 
for the performer’s individuality. This doubleness of freedom and constraint defines 
pianistic interpretation, and its tension fuels the performance-work cycle. This tension is 
related to the paradox pointed out by Kenneth Hamilton in After the Golden Age — that 
performing from memory both represented respect towards the composer and the work 
                                                 
18
 Lydia Goehr, The Quest for Voice: On Music, Politics, and the Limits of Philosophy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), 5. In other words, the contradictions inherent in musical 
practice become examples that show the systematic limitations of pure logic in general. 
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and gave the illusion of improvisation. So, which do they want? To ask this question 
would be to miss the point, for as I noted in Part 1, this phenomenon indicates an 
unwillingness to let go of either. As with the constraint-freedom paradox, the 
doubleness involved in memorising works is integral to the nature of pianistic 
interpretation. The indivisibility of poietic and esthesic processes in performance is a 
third example, in which the doubleness demonstrates Nattiez’ semiological model’s 
“own systematic limits”, as I have already shown. 
 
Finally, the cycle based on Fichte’s model for self-consciousness shows the extent to 
which the musical work is a process. It can only become as the performance proceeds. 
This may serve as a reminder to performers that in the midst of a performance, the next 
bar, the next phrase, the next movement, is not yet there. It is potentially a liberating 
thought, and should encourage performers to play with the audience’s (and even their 
own) expectations in the moment, and to feel that they are literally making the music 
there and then. 
 
The strength of the cycle model is that it accounts for the uniqueness of musical works. 
The subjective process necessarily involved in every instance (performance) of a work 
is what distinguishes the musical work (a time-bound art form) from plastic works of 
art. The process of creating a sculpture, for example, does indeed involve a reciprocal 
relationship. The sculpture is moulded according the artist’s decisions, and these 
decisions are in turn affected by the material or by the sculpture’s shape as it comes into 
being — just as Parmer wrote about performances of musical works. But once created, 
the artist is released from such a relationship with the sculpture; the relationship 
 75 
 
becomes a uni-directional one in which the artist created the sculpture (past tense for 
ever) — a single arrow pointing from the former to the latter. It is the same with 
composers and their musical works. But when the musical work is passed on to the 
performer, the cycle comes alive again, every single time he or she plays the work.  
 
I wish to stress that what I have described in this section is not a definition of the 
musical work; rather, I have tried to show the relationship between the work and the 
performer — a relationship only made possible by the conceptualisation of the work — 
based on the particular performances examined in Part 3. The model which I propose is 
not a universal way of thinking about music. My view is that the applicability of the 
model to a particular instance of music-making depends first and foremost on the 
attitude and commitment of the performer or performers towards the music. 
 
Whether I have succeeded in responding to the demands of Cook and Parmer, I do not 
know. My theorising may have circled back to the assumption that theory is a higher 
form of knowledge communication, the very attitude these scholars are combating. 
Ultimately, though, I have aimed to address the fact that past theorising on the 
work-concept has generally left the performer’s perspective out of the equation to such 
an extent that their definitions of the musical work have remained incomplete. I have 
argued that the musical work has a unique, self-reflexive and paradoxical status unlike 
the plastic arts, precisely because it requires a performance by a human agent, who 
possesses no less potential for spontaneity and subjectivity than the composer. My 
account, as some may point out, does not reflect anything like all that goes on in the 
performer’s mind during a performance. Music-making, even when involving the 
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performance of a work, is a much more contaminated act, as Abbate for instance has 
stressed; interpretative decisions may be contingent upon an infinite number of 
variables, including who is in the audience, or what other pieces are on the program. 
But my discussion has been purposely limited to the domain within the act of 
performance that involves the performer’s relationship with the work, in order to shed 
light on the status of the work.
19
 It would be a separate, massive, and surely fascinating, 
project to investigate more of the connections and processes that go on inside and 
outside the performer’s mind during a performance. The pianist’s relationship with an 
unfamiliar piano or hall, for instance, involves the former having to make certain 
on-the-spot decisions because of the particular characteristics of — or constraints placed 
by — the latter. 
 
It is an exciting notion that a live performance brings something into being anew. The 
freshness, the “now”-ness, the absolute uniqueness of a particular performance is 
something of which we need to be reminded again and again, because of its very 
ineffability. The danger of taking the work as an already-existing entity is that it 
becomes so easy to play as though tracing the tracks already trodden countless times in 
the past. Herein lies the need for continuously deconstructing the work-concept, so that 
it may be reconstructed in each performance. I call on Perahia one last time; he will now 
deconstruct none other than the performance — the concept of the great 
performance-of-a-work. 
                                                 
19
 One could also further investigate a performer’s relationship with a work over time. 
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…there are marvelous recordings, wonderful performances on record. What’s 
wonderful about them is not even so much the realization of a great piece — 
though that might be wonderful — it’s the experience of great music making 
in, let’s say, solo recordings of Cortot, Thibaud, Casals on Bach, or 
Rachmaninoff’s work. It’s the inspiration of the moment that catches one, not 
so much even the idea that this is a great performance worked out greatly. It’s a 
wonderful feeling, while you’re going through it, so it’s wonderful music 
making! That, I think, is what one tries to capture.
20
                                                 
20
 Duffie, Pianist Murray Perahia. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Scores of excerpts 
 
 
1. Johann Sebastian Bach: Prelude in F minor from the Well-Tempered Clavier Book I, 
BWV 857, second half of bar 16; graph shows tempi of bars 13-18. [Bach, Johann 
Sebastian. Das Wohltemperierte Klavier Teil I. Edited by Ernst-Günther Heinemann. 
Henle Verlag: Munich, 1997.] 
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  2. Johann Sebastian Bach: Italian Concerto BWV 971, 1st movement, bar 163; graph 
shows tempi of bars 157-170. [Bach, Johann Sebastian. Italienisches Konzert, BWV 971. 
Edited by Klaus Engler. Wiener Urtext Edition, 1977.] 
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3. Frederic Chopin: Polonaise in A flat major, Op. 53 “Heroic”, bar 17; graph shows 
tempi of bars 9-24. [Chopin, Frederic. Complete Works, Vol. VIII: Polonaises. Edited by 
Ignacy Jan Paderewski. Institut Fryderyka Chopina: Warsaw, 1951.] 
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4. Frederic Chopin: Waltz in D flat major, Op. 64 No. 1 “Minute”, bar 5; graph shows 
tempi of bars 1-20. [Chopin, Frederic. Walzer. Edited by Ewald Zimmermann. Henle 
Verlag: Munich, 1979.] 
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Appendix 2 
 
List of recordings 
(In alphabetical order of surname and with year of recording, where known) 
 
 
Bach, Prelude in F minor from the Well-Tempered Clavier Book I, BWV 857 
Vladimir Ashkenazy, 2004/5 
Samuel Feinberg, 1959? 
Edwin Fischer, 1933 
Glenn Gould, 1963 
Keith Jarrett, 1987 
Ralph Kirkpatrick, 1959 
Sviatoslav Richter, 1972/3 
Andras Schiff 
Rosalyn Tureck, 1975 
 
Bach, Italian Concerto BWV 971, First movement 
Alfred Brendel, 1976 
Lawrence Cummings, 1999 
Glenn Gould, 1959 
Wanda Landowska, 1935/6 
Alicia de Larrocha, 1971 
Sviatoslav Richter 
Christophe Rousset, 1990 
Rosalyn Tureck, 1959 
Alexis Weissenberg 
 
Chopin, Polonaise in A flat major, Op. 53 “Heroic” 
Martha Argerich, 1967 
Vladimir Ashkenazy, between 1975 and 1984 
Solomon Cutner, 1932 
György Cziffra, 1973 
Ignaz Friedman, 1927 
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Vladimir Horowitz, 1945 
Julius Katchen, 1961 
Raoul von Koczalski, circa 1924/5 
Ignacy Jan Paderewski, 1937 
Maurizio Pollini, 1975 
 
Chopin, Waltz in D flat major, Op. 64 No. 1 “Minute” 
Claudio Arrau, 1979 
Vladimir Ashkenazy, between 1977 and 1985 
Jorge Bolet, 1973 
Stephen Hough, 2010 
Dinu Lipatti, 1950 
Jean-Marc Luisada, 1990 
Nikita Magaloff, 1975 
Maria Joao Pires, 2008 
Michael von Zadora, 1929 
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Discography 
 
 
Argerich, Martha. The Collection 1: The Solo Recordings. Deutsche Grammophon 477 
5870-8, 2008. 
 
Arrau, Claudio. Chopin: Piano Concertos and Solo Works, Philips 422 038-2, 2001. 
 
Ashkenazy, Vladimir. Chopin: Polonaises. Decca 452 167-2, 1996. 
 
———. Chopin: Waltzes, Scherzos, Preludes. Decca 460 991-2, 1999. 
 
———. J. S. Bach: The Well-Tempered Clavier. Decca 475 683-2, 2005. 
 
Bolet, Jorge. Jorge Bolet in Concert, Vol. 1: Frederic Chopin. Marston 52035-2, 2004. 
 
Brendel, Alfred. Bach: Italian Concerto BWV 971, Chromatic Fantasy and Fugue BWV 
903. Philips Classics 478 9269, 2016. 
 
Cummings, Lawrence. The Art of the Baroque Harpsichord. Naxos 8.554724, 2002. 
 
Cutner, Solomon. Great Pianists of the 20th Century: Solomon. Philips Classics 456 
973-2, 1999. 
 
Cziffra, György. Chopin: Œuvres pour piano. EMI 769440-2, 1987. 
 
Feinberg, Samuel. Johann Sebastian Bach: Das Wohltemperierte Klavier. Russian 
Compact Disc 16231, 1996. 
 
Fischer, Edwin. Great Pianists of the 20th Century: Edwin Fischer. Philips Classics 456 
766-2, 1999. 
 
Friedman, Ignaz, Michael von Zadora et al. A Century of Romantic Chopin. Marston 
54001-2, 2010. 
 
Gould, Glenn. The Glenn Gould Edition: Bach: The Well-Tempered Clavier I. SM2K 
52 600, 1997. 
 
———. The Glenn Gould Edition: J. S. Bach, D. Scarlatti, C. P. E. Bach. SMC 52 620, 
1993. 
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Horowitz, Vladimir. Great Pianists of the 20th Century: Vladimir Horowitz III. Philips 
Classics 456 841-2, 1999. 
 
Hough, Stephen. Chopin: The Complete Waltzes. Hyperion CDA 67849, 2011. 
 
Jarrett, Keith. J. S. Bach: Das Wohltemperierte Klavier, Buch I. ECM 835 246-2, 1988. 
 
Katchen, Julius. Decca Recordings 1949-1968. Decca 475 7221, 2006. 
 
Kirkpatrick, Ralph. Johann Sebastian Bach: Das Wohltemperierte Clavier, Teil 1. 
Deutsche Grammophon 463 601-2, 2000. 
 
Koczalski, Raoul von. The Complete Raoul von Koczalski: Vol. 1 Polydor Recordings 
1924-1928. Marston 52063-2, 2010. 
 
Landowska, Wanda. Le Temple de la Musique Ancienne, Saint-Leu-la-Forêt: Johann 
Sebastian Bach. Paradizo PA0009, 2010. 
 
Larrocha, Alicia de. Great Pianists of the 20th Century: Alicia De Larrocha II. Philips 
Classics 456 886-2, 1999. 
 
Lipatti, Dinu. Chopin: Valses, etc. EMI 769802-2, 1986. 
 
Luisada, Jean-Marc et al. Für Elise: My First Recital. Deutsche Grammophon 459 
135-2, 1998. 
 
Magaloff, Nikita. Frederic Chopin: 19 Waltzes. Philips 426 069-2, 1989. 
 
Paderewski, Ignacy Jan. Paderewski Plays Chopin, Volume I. GEMM 9323. 
 
Pires, Maria Joao et al. Chopin Gold. Deutsche Grammophon 477 8727-3, 2010. 
 
Pollini, Maurizio et al. Chopin: Polonaises. Deutsche Grammophon 463 060-2, 1976. 
 
Richter, Sviatoslav. Complete Decca, Philips and DG Recordings. Decca 478 6778 4 
51, 2015. 
 
———. J. S. Bach: Well-Tempered Clavier BWV 846-893. VICC 40210-3, 1994. 
 
Rousset, Christophe. J. S. Bach: Italian Concerto, French Overture, Chromatic Fantasy 
and Fugue. Decca/L’oiseau Lyre 433 054-2, 1992. 
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Schiff, Andras. Johann Sebastian Bach: Das Wohltemperierte Klavier I. Decca 414 
388-2, 1984.  
 
Tureck, Rosalyn. Bach: The Well-Tempered Clavier, Book 1. BBCL 4109-2, 2002. 
 
———. Great Pianists of the 20th Century: Rosalyn Tureck II. Philips Classics 456 
979-2, 1999. 
 
Weissenberg, Alexis et al. 50 Greatest Works of Bach. Decca 477 964-3, 2011. 
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